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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Memory for Bizarre Imagery: A Storage-Retrieval Analysis 
by 
Mary Louise LaMay 
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology 
Loma Linda University, June, 2000 
Dr. David Riefer, Chairperson 
Four experiments were conducted to examine the role that storage and retrieval 
processes play in the bizarreness effect. The experiments provided a test of 
Riefer and LaMay's (1992) twolactor hypothesis, which states that bizarre 
stimuli are retrieved from Meitbry better than common stimuli, but that common 
stimuli are stored better than bizarre stimuli. The experimental results were also 
used to test the validity of Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and Rouder and 
Batchelder's (1999) multinomial models for storage and retrieval. The 
experiments explored several variables known to impact the bizarreness effect, 
including mixed vs. unmixed lists, list length, presentation rate, level of 
association, and sentence complexity. Various hypotheses were developed 
regarding how these variables affect storage and retrieval processes. The 
validity of the multinomial models was determined by examining the influence 
that the variables have on the models' storage and retrieval parameters. In 
Experiment 1, a bizarreness effect was found for mixed lists, but not for unmixed 
lists. Experiments 2 and 3 found strong bizarreness effects for short and long 
lists, fast and slow presentations, and for high and low associates. Experiment 4 
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found no bizarreness effect when sentences were simple or complex. Results of 
the experiments provided full support for Riefer and LaMay's two-factor theory. 
The validity of the Riefer-Rouder and Rouder-Batchelder models was also well 
·· supported. Both models provided plausible and logical explanations for all four
studies, although many of the original hypotheses regarding the bizarreness
effect were .not supported. Both models also pr,ovided an overall good fit to the
data, with the Riefer-Rouder model having a slight advantage over the Rouder-.
Batchelder model. The effectiveness of the models allows future researchers to




Bizarre imagery is a mnemonic device that is often used to enhance 
memory. Initially it was thought that for an item to be remembered, it should be 
as bizarre as possible (Lorayne & Lucas, 1974). However, early research on the 
bizarreness effect--the finding that bizarre stimuli are recalled better than 
common stimuli--suggested that it is often difficult to support empirically. Early 
researchers often failed to find a bizarreness effect (Hauck, Walsh, & Kroll, 
1976; Senter & Hoffman, 1976; Webber & Marshall, 1978), and instead, often 
found a recall advantage for common stimuli, which is known as the 
commonness effect (Collyer, Jonides, & Bevan, 1972; Wollen, Weber, & Lowry, 
1972). Recent research has determined that there are specific variables that 
support a bizarreness effect, e.g. using mixed lists, free recall, and incidental 
learning (Einstein & McDaniel, 1987; Riefer & Rouder, 1992), and there are 
specific variables that support a commonness effect, e.g. using unmixed lists, 
free and cued recall, and intentional learning (Riefer & LaMay, 1998). The 
purpose of the present reearch is to isolate several of the variables known to 
support a bizarreness effectcantho use Riefer and Rouder's multinomial model 
to determine their relative contributions to storage and retrieval processes in 
memory. 
Early Attempts to Obtain the Bizarreness Effect  
Conventional thinking (cf. Lorayne & Lucas, 1974) suggests that mental 
images enhance memory when they are as bizarre as possible. Although this 
1 
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was a widely held belief, dating back to the early Greeks, it was difficult to 
• support empirically. For example, in a now classic study, Wollen, Webber, and 
Lowry (1972) examined the relationship between the bizarreness and interaction 
of pictorial stimuli. It is often difficult to form a bizarre image between two stimuli 
without also forming an interactive image between them. An interaction between 
stimuli occurs when the stimuli have some level of contact with each other. 
Wollen et al. presented subjects with drawings in four different conditions (non-
interacting, non-bizarre; non-interacting, bizarre; interacting, non-bizarre, 
interacting, bizarre), and found that bizarreness had no effect on recall 
performance. But memory for bizarre images was facilitated to the extent that the 
image also depicted interaction. They concluded that interaction is the only 
variable that is effective in obtaining a bizarreness effect. Although previous 
theorists may have suggested that bizarre imagery is critical for memory 
enhancement, Wollen et al. suggested that bizarre imagery was ineffective and 
was analyzed at the expense of the more important variable of interaction. This 
research was soon replicated by Senter and Hoffman (1972) who further 
supported Wollen et al.'s finding that interaction is the important variable for 
superior recall. 
With the bi2arr.en-eSs effect .such an elusive finding, researchers 
continued to exa*mine the l'ift between the belief that bizarreness is crucial to 
memory, and the lack of empiriCal evidence to support it. Nappe and Wollen 
(1973) were early researchers who also failed in their attempt to obtain a 
bizarreness effect. They had subjects form either common or bizarre images, 
and later score the images for degree of bizarreness. They found no difference 
in common versus bizarre images; however, bizarre images took longer to form 
than common images. It was suggested that forming bizarre images requires 
experience, and for bizarre images to be effective in any circumstance, subjects 
must be highly trained in forming them; even to the extent of being professional 
mnemonists (Andreoff & Yarmey, 1976). Interestingly, Nappe and Wollen (1973) 
and other researchers (Hauck et al., 1976) found that practice effects and 
experience work only to increase the speed of image formation in general. 
Subjects still took longer forming bizarre images, which they interpreted as an 
indication that bizarre images are a less efficient form of mnemonic. 
Like earlier researchers (Senter & Hoffman, 1972; Wollen et al, 1972), 
Andreoff and Yarmey (1976) suggested that interaction is the important variable 
in bizarre imagery. However, unlike most early researchers, they were able to 
successfully obtain a bizarreness effect. They examined the effects of 
bizarreness by using delayed recall, and found that bizarreness does affect 
recall, but only after a delay of 24-hours. This was explained in terms of a 
cognitive elaboration hypothesis, in'Which bizarre images may lead to the 
formation ot,novel cognitive elaborations wyiich are more distinguishable than 
other elaborations. While &ommon=imagery instructions may lead to the 
formation of less distinctive elaborations, bizarre elaborations, which are more 
novel and unique, may lead to less inter-pair interference and greater resistance 
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to forgetting over time. This suggests that bizarre imagery may be more readily 
available as a mnemonic on delayed recall tests. O'Brien and Wolford (1982) 
also examined the effects of delayed recall of noun pairs in both common and 
bizarre paradigms, and found that after a one-week delay, the bizarreness effect 
was facilitated. However, after a three-day delay, there was no difference in 
common and bizarre stimuli. 
Successful Attempts to Obtain the Bizarreness Effect  
Following early failures to obtain a bizarreness effect, more recent 
research has established that there are several specific variables that can be 
manipulated in order to achieve a bizarreness effect (Cornoldi, Cavedon, 
DeBeni, & PraBaldi, 1988; Einstein & McDaniel, 1987; Marshall, Nau, & 
Chandler, 1980; McDaniel & Einstein 1986; Merry, 1980; O'Brien & Wolford; 
Wollen & Cox 1981a, 1981b). Some of the most compelling support for the 
bizarreness effect has resulted from studies on list-type. Early research focused 
on unmixed-list designs (Andreoff & Yarmey, 1976; Collyer et al., 1972; Hauck et t.; 
al., 1976; Nappe & Wollen, 197), in which one group of subjects receive all 
4 
common stimuli and a second group of subjects receive all bizarre stimuli. . 	• 
However, by using an unmixed-list, researchers continuously failed to obtain a 
bizarreness effect. The literature instead shows that the bizarreness effect is 
facilitated when subjects are presented with a mixed-list of both common and 
bizarre stimuli (Cornoldi et al., 1988; laccino, Dvorak, & Coler, 1989; laccino & 
Sowa, 1989; Kroll, Schepeler, & Angin, 1986; Kroll & Tu, 1988; McDaniel & 
5 
Einstein, 1986; Merry; 1989; O'Brien·& \t\/olfprd, 1982; PraBaldi, DeBeni, 
Cornoldi, & Cavedon, 1985; Wol_len & Cox, 1981 a). It is suggested that for 
bizarre stimuli to be identified as bizarre, they must be presented in the same 
context as common stimuli. Cox and Wollen (1981) examined the bizarreness 
effect by using an unmixed-list design, which is now known to facilitate common 
stimuli, and found no significant difference between bizarre and common 
conditions. The bizarre conditions, presented out of the context of common 
stimuli, failed to facilitate recall of the stimuli. Cox and Wollen posited that, when 
presented with a mixed-list, subjects spend more time rehearsing the bizarre 
sentences, possibly because they are more interesting than non-bizarre 
sentences. Thus, it appears that a bizarreness effect can only be found when 
mixed-list designs are used. 
Other variables that researchers have found to consistently facilitate a· 
bizarreness effect are free and cued recall. In a standard paired-associate 
paradigm (Paivio, 1969), subjects are presented with noun-pairs, and they are 
asked to recall them in either of two paradigms. In a free recall paradigm, subject 
are asked to recall both items of a noun-pair without a cue. But in cued recall, 
subjects are asked to recall the second item in the noun-pair given the first item 
. as a cue. Most of the early research that failed to obtain a bizarreness effect 
only examined cued·recall (Andreoff & Yarmey, 1976; Emmerich & Ackerman, 
1979; Hauck et al., 1976; Nappe & Wollen, 1973). However, it is now apparent 
that, when paired with a mixed-list design, the bizarreness effect is obtained with 
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free recall, but not with cued recall (Cornoldi etal., 1988; Kroll & Tu, 1988; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 1986, 1989; Merry, 1980; PraBaldi et al., 1985; Wollen & 
Cox, 1981a). Wollen and Cox (1981b) examined the bizarreness effect in a 
multi-trial learning task, and tested subjects in either free or cued recall 
conditions. They found that in free recall, bizarre stimuli produced significantly 
greater recall than common stimuli, and in cued recall, common stimuli produced 
consistently greater recall; offering further support for the use of a free­
recall/mixed-list paradigm in bizarre imagery. 
Early research that failed to obtain a bizarreness effect also used 
intentional learning tasks, in which subjects are.told that there will be a memory 
test following presentation of the. stimuli. Recent research (Burns, 1996; Cornoldi 
et al., 1988; laccino & Sowa, 1989; Lang, 1995; McDaniel & Ei�stein, 1986, 
1989; McDaniel, Einstein, Delosh, May, & Brady, 1995; Merry, 1980; O'Brien & 
Wolford, 1982; PraBaldi et al., 1985; Richman, Dunn, Kahl, Sadler, & Simmons, 
1990; Riefer & Rouder,:-1992�: Wollen & Cox, 1981 b; Worthen & Marshall, 1996) 
' 
r_, ... 
has fou_nd, -instead, that inc:idental· learning tasks, in which subjects are not 
aware of the subsequent memory'. test; support the bizarreness effect. Incidental 
learning tasks are usually accompanied by a rating task, and subjects are told 
that the purpose of the experiment is to observe sentences, and then to rate 
them, on a scale of one to five, for either imagery (Cox & Wollen, 1981 ), 
bizarreness (McDaniel & Einstein, 1989), or vividness (laccino et al., 1989). This 
is followed by a surprise memory test. The use of incidental learning tasks 
refutes professional mnemonists (Lorayne & Lucas, 1974) who suggest that 
bizarre imagery is a useful mnemonic tool. By its very definition, the use of 
bizarre imagery as a mnemonic would intuitively suggest intentional learning. 
Although intentional learning tasks often decrease the bizarreness effect 
(Collyer et al., 1972; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979), some research has obtained 
a commonness effect when using incidental learning rather than intentional 
learning (PraBaldi et al., 1985; Wollen & Cox, 1981a). 
Having subjects rate the vividness of their imagery produces the most 
reliable bizarreness effect (laccino et al, 1989; laccino & Sowa, 1989; McDaniel 
& Einstein, 1989). McDaniel and Einstein (1986) found that rating images for 
vividness showed a bizarreness effect with an intervening list of common 
images, but not with an intervening list of bizarre images, or an intervening list of 
semantically related words. In a similar study, Kroll et at. (1986) failed to find a 
significant bizarreness effect, but they too showed an increase in bizarre 
imagery following a vividness rating task. Subjects were asked to first image, 
and then rate sentences for bizarreness, vividness, and/or interaction. Subjects 
recalled more bizarre sentences following the vividness rating task, but not the 
bizarreness or interaction rating tasks. Kroll et al. suggested that rating 
sentences in three separate tasks may inadvertently lead subjects into semantic 
processing, rather than imagery processing. Also, there may have been a 
difference in encoding strategies between high and low-imagers, with high-ability 
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imagers encoding pictorial stimuli literally, which leads to more accurate 
encoding (O'Brien & Wolford, 1982). 
Variables that Influence the Bizarreness Effect 
It is now well established that certain variables, such as a mixed-list, 
incidental learning, free recall, and a vividness rating task, facilitate a 
bizarreness effect. More recent research has examined various independent 
variables to understand their individual influence on the bizarreness effect. For 
instance, the occasional failure to obtain a bizarreness effect when using free 
recall and a mixed-list may be due to sentence complexity (McDaniel & Einstein, 
1989; Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994). A sentence is considered complex 
when it contains several modifiers between the to-be-remembered nouns. An 
example of a complex sentence using the noun pair BANKER-NEWSPAPER is 
The stately BANKER read the rain-soaked NEWSPAPER' (it's corresponding 
simple sentence is The BANKER read the NEWSPAPER'). McDaniel and 
Einstein (1989) found that memory for bizarre imagery is facilitated when 
sentences are simple, and the advantage of bizarre imagery is eliminated when 
sentences are complex. They suggest that complex sentences decrease the 
level of imageability, which can be seen in the vividness rating task; complex 
sentences were found to have lower vividness ratings than did short, simple 
sentences. It was suggested that Complex sentences cause subjects to produce 
more elaboration of the target nouns, which should result in more distinctive 
encodings. However, complex sentences may produce encodings of common 
stimuli that are just as distinctive as encodings of bizarre stimuli. Thus, the 
difference between common and bizarre stimuli may be less pronounced when 
complex sentences are used. 
In a more recent study on sentence complexity, Robinson-Riegler and 
McDaniel (1994) examined possible explanations for the elimination of the 
bizarreness effect when noun modifiers are added into the stimuli. They 
indicated that obtaining a bizarreness effect with complex sentences is tenuous 
at best, and contrasts sharply with the consistent finding of a bizarreness effect 
with simple sentences. Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel suggest that the cues 
associated with the complexity of the sentences may be more salient than the 
cues associated with the bizarreness of the sentence. Thus, subjects may use 
the cues associated with complexity, which would, in essence, overpower the 
cues associated with bizarreness [cf. Smith's (1988) discussion of environmental 
effects]. 
According to McDaniel and Einstein (1989), sentence complexity reduces 
the imageability of the bizarre stimuli. This implies that obtaining a bizarreness 
effect in a complex sentence requires more processing time because of its 
sensitivity to presentation rates. This may be influenced by the novelty of bizarre 
sentences, which would imply longer processing times for bizarre stimuli than for 
common stimuli Kline and Groninger (1991) examined presentation rates and 
their effect on bizarre imagery, and found that a short presentation rate (11 s) 
facilitates common sentences, and a longer presentation rate (15 s) facilitates 
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bizarre seQtences. Thus, a bizarreness effect can occur with complex sentences, 
l ' 
. ,,c , 
' 
providing that enough prqce�sing tirne is. given. 
' . . : " . . • • ,, t . "'� : ., .
Worthen and Marshall (1996) examined intralist and extralist sources of 
distinctiveness in the bizarreness effect. lntralist sources of distinctiveness exist 
when a given item type is the numerical minority in a specific list. For example, in 
a list of 15 common and 5 bizarre sentences, the bizarre sentences are the · 
numerical mir1ority based on the total number of sentences presented. Extralist 
sources, however, exist when a given item type is the numerical minority relative 
to one's previous experience and stored knowledge, which is often true of 
bizarre sentences. Because most bizarre stimuli are based on novel information, 
subjects must rely on previously stored knowledge that is likely to contain 
categories of information that may be accessed for purposes of comparison and 
contrast. Worthen and Marshall based their study on previous research 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986) that examined mixed-lists, in which bizarre items 
are made distinct by the presence of common items. A bizarre advantage was 
found when subjects were presented with sentences consisting of equal 
numbers of common and bizarre stimuli. However, these results differed when 
the percentages of common and bizarre stimuli were varied within the 
sentences. For instance, more bizarre stimuli were recalled from predominantly 
common lists, and with lists consisting of eqtJal numbers of common and bizarre 
stimuli, which further supports McDaniel-and Einstein. 
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In a fall-back to earlier research, laccino (1996) recently re-introduced a 
delayed recall paradigm in order to determine whether an unmixed-list of bizarre 
stimuli is as effective as a mixed-list of common and bizarre stimuli, especially 
with varying degrees of delayed recall. Subjects were presented with one of 
three lists: unmixed common, unmixed bizarre, or mixed lists of common and 
bizarre items, and were then given a cued recall test that was either immediate, 
presented after a 3-day delay, or presented after a 5-day delay. Results indicate 
that immediate recall was best for mixed-lists; this result also persisted after a 3-
day delay. After a 5-day delay, an unmixed-list of bizarre sentences was recalled 
just as effectively as mixed-lists. These results suggest that bizarre imagery is 
an effective mnemonic with the provision that lists are mixed, or unmixed after 
long delays in recall. 
Burns (1996) also re-introduced well-established variables, and examined 
the bizarreness effect and intention to learn. He presented subjects with either 
incidental or intentional study instructions, and found that the bizarreness effect 
occurred only with incidental instructions, and was eliminated with intentional 
instructions. These results suggest that bizarre imagery does improve retention, 
but not under the intentional learning instructions used by mnemonists. Thus, 
because of the excessive constraints on the bizarreness effect, this calls to 
question the widely held belief that bizarre images enhances memory. 
Finally, Lang (1995) examined the level of association between noun-
pairs. She suggested that a major weakness in previous research is that it did 
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not use materials that were sensitive to the relative association level between 
the stimuli when examining the bizarreness effect. Association levels are either 
weak or strong. For example, a weak association is seen in the noun-pair 
'HORSE-CRATE,' and a strong association is seen in the noun-pair 'HORSE-
HAY.' Lang based her research on Hirshman, Whelley, and Palij (1989), who 
assumed a weak association if stimuli were formed into a bizarre image, and a 
strong association if stimuli was formed in to a common image. Based on this 
assumption, Lang presented subjects with four conditions: strong association 
level, bizarre context; strong association level, common context; weak 
association level, bizarre context; and weak association level, common context. 
Results indicated that strongly related stimuli lead to the bizarreness effect, 
while weakly related stimuli lead to the commonness effect. 
A Storage-Retrieval Account of the Bizarreness Effect  
Once the variables needed to obtain the bizarreness effect were 
identified, several theories emerged to provide explanations for the cognitive 
processes important to the bizarreness effect (Einstein & McDaniel, 1987). For 
example, the attentional hypothesis suggests that bizarre sentences arouse 
attention and interest due to their novelty (Merry, 1980). Bizarre sentences 
improve memory because they receive a greater amount of processing than 
common sentences, which provides a plausible explanation for observing the 
bizarreness effect in mixed-lists and not in unmixed-lists. Therefore, the context 
- 
of common images is necessary in order to focus attention on bizarre images. In 
3 
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contrasf, the retrieval inhibition hypothesis states that the retrieval of one item in 
a list inhibits the retrieval of other items in the same list. This suggests that 
bizarre images have a better representation in memory than common images, 
and because of this, bizarre images block the retrieval of common images. 
Einstein and McDaniel ( 1987) posited a distinctiveness hypothesis, which 
suggests that the distinctiveness of an event is determined by its relation to 
other encoded events. Bizarre images depict more exaggerated, distorted, or 
unusual relationships among objects, and are, by definition, more distinctive 
than common images. The distinctiveness of an event can be determined by two 
factors: First, the distinctive items shares few features in common with other 
information in memory, which is true of bizarre items, and second, 
distinctiveness is defined in a relative manner, in which the uniqueness of the 
event is determined by its relationship relative to other items in the list. 
Therefore, bizarre materials should produce encodings that are relatively more 
distinctive in the context of common materials than in the context of bizarre 
materials. This explains why the bizarreness effect occurs in mixed-list designs, 
and not in unmixed-list designs (McDaniel & Einstein, 1991 ). 
Riefer and Rouder (1992) reviewed these theories and framed them in 
terms of storage and retrieval processes. For instance, the attentional 
hypothesis is a storage-based explanation for the commonness effect, and the 
retrieval inhibition hypothesis uses retrieval factors to explain the bizarreness 
effect. According to Riefer and Rouder, evidence for the retrieval explanation of 
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the bizarreness effect occurs because memory for bizarre imagery is enhanced 
by free recall and not cued recall. This occurs because in a cued recall 
paradigm, the first item in a list is given, which tends to lessen the importance of 
retrieval processes. 
Storage and retrieval processes are the bases of the two-factor 
hypothesis proposed by Riefer and LaMay (1998). This hypothesis is based on 
the storage-retrieval distinction and suggests that common stimuli are stored in 
memory better than bizarre stimuli, and bizarre stimuli are retrieved from memory 
better than common stimuli. Riefer and LaMay suggested that a storage-based 
explanation for the commonness effect is consistent with schema-based theories 
of memory (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). When common items are integrated with 
preexisting schema, the items are stored better in memory. Riefer and Rouder 
(1992) verified that bizarre stimuli are retrieved from memory better than 
common stimuli, which may be due to their distinctiveness in memory (McDaniel 
et al., 1995). 
Riefer and Rouder's Multinomial Model  
In order to examine storage and retrieval processes in bizarre imagery, 
Riefer and Rouder (1992) developed a mathematical model, known as a 
multinomial model, to measure unobservable cognitive events (for a theoretical 
and empirical review of multinomial models, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999). To 
measure these processes, subjects engage in a standard paired-associate 
paradigm in which two capitalized nouns (the stimulus and response) are 
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embedded within a common or a bizarre sentence. The subject is told to form an 
image between the two nouns in each sentence, in order to recall them in a 
' 
. 
memory tes� ��ich follows prese.ntation of the_ sentences. The subjects are then 
tested in both a free recall, and a cued recall memory test. For instance, subjects 
may be given the bizarre sentence, 'The MAN was wearing the CHAIR.' In the 
cued recall condition, the subject is given the word 'MAN,' and is asked to recall 
the word 'CHAIR,' and in a free recall paradigm, the subject is asked to recall 
both 'MAN' and 'CHAIR,' without a 9ue. 
From this standard testing procedure, free-recall responses fall into three 
categories: Subjects freely recall both words, they recall the stimulus or 
response term (but not both), or they recall neither term. In cued recall, subjects 
either recall the response or they do not recall it. From this information a 
multinomial model was developed, based on five statistical parameters, which 
' 
. 
can determine whether recall of the bizarre items is due to retrieval and whether 
recall of the common items is due to storage. 
The multinomial modeling analysis evolves statistically from the analysis 
of six separate recall events (see Figure 1 ): 
E 1 - both items freely recalled, correct cued-recall; 
E2 - one and only one item freely recalled, correct cued-recall; 
� - neither item freely recalled, correct cued-recall; 
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Figure 1. Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial processing-tree model. 
£.s- one and only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; 
E6 - neither item freely recalled, incorrect cued-rec�II. 
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The probability of these six recall events can be obtained through a 
statistical analysis which begins with the following hypothetical cognitive events, 
represented by parameters .§, r1 , r2 , §1 , §2 in the model. These cognitive events 
are: 
.§ - probability of forming and storing a stimulus-response association; 
r1 - retrieval of the association during free-recall; 
fa - retrieval of the association during cued-recall; 
§
1 - probability that exactly one item in a pair is recalled independently during
free re cal I; 
§2 - probability of singleton recall of non-retrieved associates. 
Of these five items, the two that are most important to the present experiment 
are.§, which measures storage, and r1 , which measures retrieval. The remaining 
parameters, fa, §1 , and §2, are less important to the storage and retrieval· issues, 
and are considered nuisance variables. 
From these five parameters; the probabilities for each data event can be 
established using the following formulas: 
. " 
"· . ... :i, t 
_. I 1,.._ 
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P(E5) = a(1-t1)(112) 1 +(1-g)§2, 
P(E6) = a(1-E1)(1-E2)(1-_q1)+(1-2)(1-§2). 
Once the probabilities are established, the closed-form solutions for the 
parameters are determined: 
a 	= [(N1+N2+N13)(N1+MiNN1, 
= NAN +N2÷1.•_1.3), 
r2 	= NANi-FrA4), 
= N2/(N2-1-113), 
—s2 	= (N11 5-N21141 Y[Ni(N5+N6)-N4(N2+13)]. 
In these closed form solutions, Ni is the frequency of the Ei events, and 
= Ni+N2N +_3 +N44-L16+1A6. 
In observing the model, it can be seen that there are five parameters as 
well as five independent data events. This leaves no degrees of freedom in 
which to test the goodness of fit to the model. In order to free up one degree of 
freedom, it is possible to set parameters s1 and s2 (the singleton parameters) 
equal to each other (i.e., s1 = 2 ).  This is an acceptable solution in many 
situations because both of these parameters represent recalling individual items 
that were not recalled as word pairs. The unrestricted version of the model, in 
which s1 and s2 represent two separate events, is known as Case I; the restricted 
version of the model, in which s1 = s2, is known as Case II. 
Riefer and Rouder (1992) used their multinomial model to determine the 
cognitive processes that facilitate the bizarreness effect. Subjects were 
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presented with both bizarre and common sentences using a mixed-list design, 
and an incidental learning task. Riefer and Rouder had subjects rate the 
sentences for vividness, and presented subjects with a free recall, followed by a • 
cued recall memory test. The bizarreness effect was found in two of three 
variations of this experiment. The multinomial modeling analysis was then used 
to determine whether this effect was due to Storage or retrieval. It was found that 
in the two experiments, subjects retrieved significantly more bizarre than 
common noun-pairs. Therefore, bizarre sentences benefitted from retrieval, and 
not from storage processes in memory. 
After Riefer and Rouder (1992) concluded that bizarre images benefit 
from retrieval, Riefer and LaMay (1998) suspected that common images should 
benefit from storage processes in memory. In order to explore the relationship 
between common images and storage processes, Riefer and LaMay had to first 
obtain a commonness effect. However, prior research had only identified 
variables that consistently obtained a bizarreness effect. Several studies had 
obtained a commonness effect, but it was always the reciprocal effect of an 
initial attempt to obtain a bizarreness effect (Cox & Wollen, 1981; Kroll et al., 
1986). This reciprocal nature of the commonness effect was the basis for 
research conducted, by Riefer and ,LaMay, who suggested that it should be 
possible to manipulate specific variables to obtain a commonness effect, just as 
3, 
specific variables could be manipulated to obtain a bizarreness effect. 
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Riefer and LaMay (1998) examined past research on the bizarreness 
effect in order to identify the variables needed to achieve an initial commonness 
effect, regardless of an inability to obtain a bizarreness effect. By reversing the 
variables that previous research had identified to consistently obtain a 
bizarreness effect (mixed list, incidental learning, free recall, delayed recall, long 
presentation rate), Riefer and LaMay successfully identified an unmixed-list 
design (Collyer et al., 1972; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979), intentional learning 
(Collyer et al., 1972; Emmerich .& Ackerman, 1979; Wollen & Cox, 1981b), free 
and cued recall (PraBaldi et al., 1985; Wollen & Cox, 1981a, 1981b), immediate 
recall (O'Brien & Wolford, 1982), and short presentation rate (Kline & Groninger, 
1991), as the variables necessary to obtain a commonness effect. Once a 
commonness effect was achieved, Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial 
model was used to determine that common images benefit from storage 
processes in memory. 
Riefer and LaMay (1998) took these findings and developed a two-factor 
hypothesis that states that bizarre items benefit from retrieval processes in 
memory, and common items benefit from storage processes in memory. The two-
factor hypothesis provides plausible explanations for why various stimuli affect 
the bizarreness effect. For example, the two-factor hypothesis suggests that 
cued recall eliminates the bizarreness effect because using cues in a paired-
associate paradigm may minimize or eliminate retrieval, and thus neutralize the 
bizarreness effect. Also, a retrieval-based explanation for the failure to obtain a 
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bizarreness effect in complex sentences is provided by the two-factor 
hypothesis, which suggests that a retrieval advantage is eliminated in complex 
sentences because the cues associated with complexity are equally effective for 
common and bizarre sentences. Presentation rate can be explained by the two-
factor hypothesis; a long presentation rate provides extra study time, which 
allows for greater storage, and thus, reduces the storage disadvantage for 
bizarre items. By reducing the storage disadvantage, and retaining the retrieval 
advantage, the bizarreness effect may be strengthened. Finally, the two-factor 
hypothesis supports the idea that high levels of association, like extra study 
time, enhances the storage of bizarre -stimuli relative to common stimuli. Based 
on the assumption that common items are already stored well, it is apparent that 
the storage advantage for common items is reduced, and the bizarreness effect 
is strengthened. 
Rouder and Batchelder's Multinomial Model  
Rouder and Batchelder (1999) also examined storage and retrieval 
parameters in common and bizarre imagery, and developed an alternative 
version to Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial model. They used the same 
free-then-cued-recall paradigm, and based their model on the same general 
principles as Riefer and Rouder. The differences between the two models occur 
in the assumptions about secondary processes, such as cued recall retrieval 
and singleton recall. Riefer and Rouder assume that, in singleton recall, only 
one of the items in a pair is recalled independently during free recall. They also 
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assume that the separate events of recalling stimulus and response items as 
singletons are mutually exclusive rather than independent (i.e., if a subject 
successfully recalls a stimulus item as a singleton, he or she can not do so on 
the response item, and vice-versa). In addition, Riefer and Rouder assume that 
the probability of singleton recall is the same, whether or not associative storage 
occurs. 
Rouder and Batchelder (1999) suggest that a benefit to their model is that 
there are more psychologically plausible assumptions reflected in the current 
model family that can be used to obtain testable submodels. First, they suggest 
that the processes in the model occur serially, and in an order corresponding to 
the order of the subtasks in the paradigm (i.e., list study, free recall, and cued 
recall). It is only after a successful storage of an association that associative 
retrieval or cued recall can be successful. However, successful storage is not 
sufficient to guarantee correct cued recall performance. It is possible that a 
subject may experience post-storage forgetting. This is unlikely with a short 
delay between the free and cued recall tasks, but it becomes more significant 
with a long delay between tasks. Therefore, Rouder and Batchelder suggest that 
memory encodings that afford successful retrieval are more resistant to 
forgetting. Finally, the model treats both the stimulus and response terms as 
equivalent, conditionally independent events. 
The tree diagram for Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) multinomial model 
is shown in Figure 2. Like Riefer and Rouder (1992), Rouder and Batchelder's 
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Figure 2. Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) multinomial processing-tree model. 
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rnultinomial model evolves statistically from the analysis of six separate recall 
events, yielding five degrees of freedom: 
Ei  - both items freely. recalled, correct cued recall; 
E2 - one and only one item freely recalled, correct cued recall; 
E3 - neither item freely,recalled, correct cued recall; 
E - both items freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; 
E5 - one and only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; 
E6 - neither item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall. 
The probability of these six recall events can be obtained through a 
statistical analysis which begins with the following hypothetical cognitive events, 
represented by parameters a, r; s, f , f2, u, in the model. These cognitive events 
are: 
a - 	Associative storage: probability of forming and storing a stimulus- 
response association; 
Associative retrieval: retrieval of the association during free recall (correct 
free recall performance on both stimulus and response items); 
s - 	Stored singleton retrieval: probability that exactly one item in a pair is 
recalled independently during free recall; 
fi - 	Failure to recall stored associations: probability of forgetting conditioned 
upon a retrieval success during free recall; 
f2 _ 	Failure to recall stored associations: probability of forgetting conditioned 
upon retrieval failure during free recall. 
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U - 	Recall of non-associated item pairs: if associative storage does not occur, 
it is still possible that the subject stores and retrieves the stimulus and 
response items as conditionally independent events (the conditional 
probability of storing and retrieving an item). 
From these six parameters, the probabilities for each data event can be 
established using the following formulas: 
P(Ei) = ar(1 41)+ a(1 -1)s2(1 42), 
P(E2) = 2a(1 -E)s(1 -s)(1 42), 
P(E3) = 
▪ = 	+a(1-E)s2f2+(1 -a)u2, 
P(E5) = 2a(1-E)s(1-s)f2+2(1-g)u(1-g), 
P(E6) = a(1-0(1-s)2f2+(1-g)(1-m )2. 
NI; is the frequency of event Ei, and N is the total number of item pairs, 
N=ENi. Pi is the proportion of events in the ith category, where Pi =N/N, and 
pi = Pr(E) is the underlying true probability of Ei. 
As with Riefer and Rouder's (1992) model, Rouder and Batchelder's 
(1999) model has six parameters with only five independent data events. This 
leaves no degrees of freedom for testing the fit of the model; in fact, it makes the 
model non-identifiable. However, Rouder and Batchelder (1999) offer a basic 
assumption that ultimately frees up enough degrees of freedom to test the 
model. The assumption suggests that once an association is retrieved during 
free recall, an immunity is formed, and the possibility of forgetting during cued 
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recall is virtually non-existent. Therefore, it is possible to set both forgetting 
parameters to zero (i.e., f1 = 2 = 0). This assumption leaves four parameters in 
the model (a, r, s, u) and results in enough degrees of freedom for testing the 
model. 
Riefer and LaMay (1998) applied Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) model 
to their data from their experiment and found that it fit the data better than Riefer 
and Rouder's (1992) model. However, the same pattern of results were 
produced by both models; i.e., common items were stored significantly better 
than bizarre items. The superior fit of Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) model 
suggests that it may be a more parsimonious and valid methodology for 
measuring storage and retrieval processes in memory. The present experiments 
will apply both models to the data in order to determine which model provides a 
better overall fit. 
The Current Study _ 
In their research on bizarre imagery, Riefer and Rouder (1992) applied 
their multinomial modeling technique and found, as they hypothesized, that the 
bizarreness effect is indeed due to higher rates of retrieval in memory. They 
focused on storage and retrieval processes in bizarre imagery; however, Riefer 
and LaMay (1998) examined the role of different cognitive processes in memory. 
More specifically, they determined the relationship between common imagery 
and storage processes in memory. They suggested that common items benefit 
storage because, unlike bizarre items which are often difficult to relate to, 
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common items are easy to relate to, making them easier to store. By combin_ing 
these findings, Riefer and LaMay ·developed their two-factor hypothesis that 
suggests that bizarre items benefit from retrieval processe·s in memory and 
common items benefit from storage processes in memory. 
The current series of studies are .designed to further examine Riefer and 
LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis on several variables known to achieve a 
bizarreness effect. The validity of Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial model 
will be examined as well as the strength of Riefer and LaMay's two-factor 
hypothesis. It is reasonable to assume that storage and retrieval can differ 
between bizarre and common items in many different situations. Thus, the 
present study will isolate several variables that contribute to the bizarreness 
effect. 
For instance, the present study will use Riefer and Rouder's (1992) 
multinomial model to explore differences between mixed-list and unmixed-list 
designs and how they impact the bizarreness effect. Research has shown that. 
mixed-list designs facilitate the bizarren�ss effect (Cornoldi et al., 1988; laccino 
et al., 1989; laccino & Sowa, 1989; Kroll et al., 1986; Kroll & Tu, 1988; McDaniel 
& Einstein, 1986; Merry, 1980; O'Brien & Wolford, 1982; PraBaldi et al., 1985; 
Wollen & Cox, 1981 a), and unmixed-list designs do not (An.dreoff & Yarmey, 
1976; Collyer et al., 1972; Hauck et al., 1976; Nappe & Wollen, 1973). McDaniel 
and Einstein (1986) suggested that bizarre images produce higher recall than 
common· images in a mixed-list design, but not in an unmixed-list design, 
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because of the accessibility of the bizarre images. The context of common 
stimuli makes the bizarre stimuli more unique and novel, and in a free-recall 
paradigm, it makes the bizarre stimuli more available, which implies enhanced 
retrievability. Subjects in the present study will be presented with either a mixed 
list of common and bizarre sentences, an unmixed list of common sentences, or 
an unmixed list of bizarre sentences. A bizarreness effect, and an increase in 
Riefer and Rouder's (1992) retrieval parameter r ,  are expected to emerge in the 
mixed lists, but not in the unmixed lists. In addition, the storage parameter a 
should be relatively unaffected by mixed vs. unmixed lists. 
Kline and Groninger (1991) examined presentation rate and suggested 
that, due to their novelty, bizarre sentences take more time to encode into 
memory. They suggested that common items are recalled better with a short 
presentation rate (11 s) while bizarre items are recalled better with a long 
presentation rate (15 s). An interesting addition to bizarre imagery research 
would be to examine presentation rate and list length and their relation to the 
bizarreness effect. Barnhart and Glenberg (1990) examined list length and 
determined that shorter-lists and longer presentation rates lead to better recall. 
However, they did not specifically address the relationship between list length 
and bizarre imagery. Recall advantages for bizarre sentences have been found 
when subjects were presented with 12 sentences (Riefer & Rouder, 1992) and 
recall advantages for common sentences have been found with 20 sentences 
(Riefer & LaMay, 1998). Other researchers (e.g., McDaniel et al., 1995) 
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manipulated list length and determined that the bizarreness effect occurs with 
mixed lists of common and bizarre sentences, regardless of length. Clearly, list 
length and presentation rate are two variables that have yet to be systematically 
studied with regards to the bizarreness effect. 
The present study will examine the relationship between list length and 
presentation rate and their overall effect on bizarre imagery. Subjects will be 
presented with mixed lists of short (10 sentences) or long (20 sentences) list 
lengths, and fast (6 s) or slow (12 s) presentation rates. A bizarreness effect is 
expected to be found with a long presentation rate and a short list length, and 
should be eliminated or weakened under the remaining conditions. Riefer and 
LaMay (1998) suggest that extra study time may help to overcome the storage 
disadvantage for bizarre stimuli (as measured by parameter a), and with the 
assumption that the bizarre items retain their retrieval advantage, this may help 
to strengthen the bizarreness effect. 
A third variable that impacts the bizarreness effect is level of association. 
Lang (1995) found that bizarre stimuli are recalled better with high-associate 
items, while common stimuli are recalled better with low-associate items. Lang 
also found that high-associate items are recalled better than low-associate 
items. Riefer and LaMay (1998) suggest that high levels of association are 
analogous to extra study time, which enhances the storage of bizarre stimuli 
over common stimuli. With the assumption that common stimuli are already 
stored well, it is apparent that highly-associated stimuli disproportionately 
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increase the storage of bizarre stimuli. This reduces the storage advantage for 
common stimuli, thus strengthening the bizarreness effect. It is expected that the 
_ present study will replicate Lang's findings; a bizarreness effect should be found 
in the high-associate condition, and it should be eliminated in the low-associate 
condition. It is hypothesized that high-associates should increase the storage of 
all items (as measured by parameter a), but should have a stronger effect on 
bizarre stimuli. High levels of association should therefore reduce the storage 
advantage of common stimuli without effecting the retrieval advantage of bizarre 
stimuli, which should consequently enhance the bizarreness effect 
The present study will also expand on research by Robinson-Riegler and 
McDaniel (1994) who examined sentence complexity in order to determine why 
the mnemonic benefit of bizarreness is not found in complex sentences. They 
support other theorists (Beech & Allport, 1978; McDaniel & Einstein, 1989) who 
argue that the bizarreness advantage for complex stimuli is diminished when 
incorporating new objects into an image. The tenuous nature of the bizarreness 
effect with complex sentences is contrasted sharply with the consistent finding of 
a bizarreness effect when simple sentences are used. Thus, a recall advantage 
for bizarre imagery is evidentwhen the sentences are relatively simple, and free 
of the extra noun modifiers apparent in complex sentences. 
The impoverished encodings of simple sentences may force subjects to 
rely on the bizarreness of the stimuli as a retrieval cue, and thus a bizarreness 
effect is obtained. However, when sentences are rich and complex, more 
31 
specific retrieval cues are available to help with recall of the target nouns, and 
thus the bizarreness effect is eliminated (Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994). It 
is suggested that the cues associated with complex sentences are more salient 
and precise than cues associated with bizarre sentences, which may cause the 
cues associated with complexity to dominate. Riefer and LaMay (1998) 
expanded on this idea, and sugge.st that retrieval cues associated with 
complexity are equally effective in common and bizarre sentences, and thus they 
eliminate the recall advantage for bizarre stimuli. . 
The present study will examine sentence complexity by presenting 
subjects with mixed lists of simple sentences or mixed lists of complex 
sentences. Because of a lack of retrieval cues associated with complexity, a 
bizarreness effect is expected to emerge in the simple-sentence condition 
(Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994). By eliminating the extra noun modifiers 
associated with complex sentences, subjects should focus on the bizarreness of 
· the stimuli, which should serve as retrieval cues and support a retrieval-based
explanation for the bizarreness effect. Therefore, a retrieval advantage ( an
increase in retrieval parameter r1) should emerge when subjects are presented
with bizarre stimuli embedded within simple sentences, and should be
neutralized when subjects are presented with complex sentences. Differences in
the storage parameter.§ should be minimal as a function of sentence complexity.
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment used Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and Rouder and 
Batchelder's (1999) multinomial.models to explore differences between mixed­
list and unmixed-list designs and how they impact the bizarreness effect. 
Research has shown that mixed-list designs facilitate the bizarreness effect, but 
unmixed-list designs do not. Subjects in the present study were presented with 
either a mixed list of common and bizarre sentences, an unmixed list of common 
sentences, or an unmixed list of bizarre sentences. A bizarreness effect, 
accompanied by an increase in Riefer and Rouder's (1992) retrieval parameter 
r1 , is expected to emerge in the mixed list, but not in the unmixed lists. If Riefer 
and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis is correct, then it should be possible 
to obtain a storage advantage for common items (an increase in Riefer & 
Rouder's storage parameter.§.), in addition to a retrieval advantage for bizarre 
items within the same experimental design. There should be no difference 
between bizarre and common stimuli in the unmixed-list conditions, and storage 




Subjects were 94 male and female undergraduate students from 
California State University, San Bernardino. Fifty-one subjects were in the 
. mixed-list gr:oup, 21 subjects were in the unmixed-list/common group, and 
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22 subjects were in the unmixed-lisUbizarre group. All subjects were given extra 
course credit for their participation. 
Materials 
All subjects were presented with 12 sentences. Each sentence contain�d 
a noun-pair (e.g., BANKER-NEWSPAPER) that described either a common or a 
bizarre relationship between the items. An example of a common sentence for 
the noun-pair BANKER-NEWSPAPER is 'The BANKER read the NEWSPAPER;' 
its corresponding bizarre sentence is 'The BANKER floated on the 
NEWSPAPER.' Noun-pairs were capitalized within each sentence. Most of the 
· sentences were modifications of those used by previous researchers (Lang,
1995; McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; Riefer & LaMay, 1998; Riefer & Rouder, 1992;
Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994). A full set of sentences is listed in
Appendix A
Design
The d�ta for Experiment 1 were .ar;,alyzed separately for free and cued 
recall, and separately for mixed and unmixed lists. Subjects in the mixed-list 
condition were presented with a combination of 6 common and 6 bizarre 
sentences, which makes the type of stimuli in the mixed-list condition a within­
subjects variable. Subjects in the unmixed-list condition, however, received 
either a list of.12 common sentences or a list of 12 bizarre sentences, which 




Subjects were run in groups ranging from 3 to 18 people. Sentences were 
presented on slides projected onto a screen in front of subjects at a rate of 10 s 
per slide. Slides were presented one at a time, in random order, to each set of 
subjects. All subjecis were presented with 12 sentences: subjects in the mixed-
list group received 6 common and 6 bizarre sentences, subjects in the unmixed-
list/common group received 12 common sentences, and subjects in the unmixed-
list/bizarre group received the 12 corresponding bizarre sentences. 
Subjects were instructed that they were participating in a study examining 
imagery ability. All subjects were asked to read 12 sentences containing two 
noun-pairs; they were told to form a mental image of each sentence, and to rate 
the vividness of the image on a 5 point scale, with 5 indicating that the image 
was clear; very vivid, and 1 indicating that the image was unclear; not vivid at all. 
Because of the incidental design, no mention was made of the subsequent 
memory test. Following the rating task, subjects were given a three min 
distractor task in which they circled small differences between pairs of nearly 
identical pictures. This helped to reduce recency effects. Subjects were then 
given a three min free recall period in which they recalled both the stimulus and 
response items onto a blank piece of paper. Subjects were asked to recall both 
items of each noun-pair, and if they did not remember both items, they were 
asked to write down what items they did remember. Immediately following the 
free recall portion was a cued recall, in which the stimulus of each noun-pair was 
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presented in random order on a single sheet of paper. It was the subject's 
responsibility to recall the response item in each noun-pair. The cued portion 
also lasted three min. 
Results 
Empirical Analysis  
Appendix B contains the raw data for each individual subject reported in 
this study. Table 1 presents the proportion correct for free and cued recall in 
both the mixed-list and the unmixed-list conditions for Experiment 1. Free recall 
is represented by the number of noun-pairs, in which at least one item was freely 
recalled. Cued recall is represented by the,number of noun-pairs in which the 
second item was correctly recalled, given the first item as a cue (cf. Riefer & 
Rouder, 1992). Free and cued recall were analyzed separately for the mixed-list 
and the unmixed-list conditions. Table 1 indicates that, for mixed lists, subjects 
recalled significantly more bizarre items than common items in the free recall 
condition, t(50) = 3.97, p <.01. Conversely, common items were recalled 
significantly more than bizarre items in the cued recall condition, t(50) = 3.48, p 
<.01. For the unmixed lists, there were no significant differences between 
common and bizarre items in the free recall condition, t(41) = 0.04, nor in the 
cued recall condition, t(41) = 1.58. These results support past researchers (e.g., 
laccino et al., 1989; Wollen & Cox, 1981a), who suggest that a bizarreness 
effect is found in mixed lists of common and bizarre items because the bizarre 
items stand out in the presence of common items. The present results also 
Table 1 
Proportion Correct for Bizarre and Common Sentences in Mixed and Unmixed 
Free Recall 
Common Bizarre 
Mixed-List .40 (.22) .56 (.24) 
Unmixed:tist { ·- � . · f • ·• 1.55 c(.17) .55 (.17) 
Note. Standard aeviations are iri parentheses. 
Cued Recall 
Common Bizarre 
. 7 4 (.25) .65 (.26) 
.80 (.23) .66 (.33) 
support McDaniel and Einstein (1986), who suggest that bizarre items are 
recalled better in mixed-list designs. 
Riefer-Rouder Model Analysis 
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The full. version of Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial model contains·
�.. ,\. ·, ;; . . 
five parameters applied to five independent data events, which leaves no 
� ' • ' : • • 
degrees of freedom to test the goodness of fit of the model. Case I is the
: • � ' �' i ' • . ' " 
unrestricted version of the model containing all five parameters. However, to free 
up one degree of freedom, it is possible to set the singleton parameters equal to 
one another (§.1 = §.2), which represents Case II of the model. The goodness of fit 
can then be tested for this version. Table 2 presents the data events for each 
condition, and the loglikelihood ratio statistic G2 , which is used to analyze the 
goodness of fit of Case 11 of the model. The G2 statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as a chi-square variable (see Riefer & Batchelder, 1988), with a 
critical value of 3.84 for 1 degree of freedom. As can be seen, a go(?d fit was 
found in three of the four conditions. A poor fit was observed only when common 
sentences were presented in a mixed-list design. 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for each condition. Bizarre 
items were retrieved significantly better than common items ( as measured by 
retrieval parameter r1) when they were presented in a mixed-list design, G
2(1) = 
16.52, Q < .001. In contrast, common items were stored significantly better than 
bizarre items ( as measured by storage parameter §.) when they were presented 
in the mixed-list design, G2(1) = 9.34, Q < .01. This observed storage advantage 
Table 2 
Ni Recall Statistics and Goodness of Fit for Bizarre and Common Images in  
Experiment 1 for Riefer and Rouder's (R & R) (1992) and Rouder and  
Batchelder's (R & B) (1999) Multinomial Models  
G2(1)  
N1 N2 	N4 t_61 N6 	R&R R&B 
Mixed-List 
Bizarre 134 8 56 2 22 84 1.95 0.14 
Common 110 3 115 4 8 66 5.62* 9.83* 
Unmixed-List 
Bizarre 99 13 62 13 22 55 2.73 11.81* 
Common 124 5 70 0 9 44 3.34 0.83 
* <O5 
Note. N1 = both items freely recalled, correct cued recall; N2 = one and only one 
item freely recalled, correct cued recall; t13 = neither item freely recalled, correct 
cued recall; N4 = both items freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; IN5 = one and 
only one item freely recalled, inCOrrect cued recall; and N6 = neither item freely 
recalled, incorrect cued recall. G2(1) is the loglikelihood ratio statistic. 
Table 3 
Parameter Estimates from Experiment 1 for Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and 
Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) Multinomial Models 
Riefer & Rouder 
Unmixed-List 
Bizarre .7,S. .57 .88 .23 
'{.'72 - :78) (.53 - .61) (.85 - .91) (.20 - .26) 
Common �.79' . . 62 1.00 .11 
(.77 - .81) (.59 -.65) (1.0 - 1.0) (.08 - .14) 
Mixed-List 
Bizarre .66 .68 .99 .18 
(.63 - .69) (.65 - .71) (.98 - 1.00) (.15 -.21) 
Common .77 .48 .96 .06 
(.74 - '.80) (.45 - .51) (.94 - .98) (.04 - .08) 
Rouder & Batchelder .§ r § !J. 
Unmixed-List 
Bizarre .66 .57 .09 .27 
(.63 - .69) (.53 - .61) (.06 - .12) (.24 - .30) 
Common .79 .62 .03 .09 
(.76 -.82) (.59 - .65) (.01 - .05) (.06 - .12) 
Mixed-List 
Bizarre .65 .68 .07 .12 
(.62 - .68) (.65 - .71) (.05 - .09) (.10 -.14) 
Common .75 .48 .01 .10 
(.73 - .77) . (.45 - .51) (.00 - .02) (.08 - .12) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Riefer and Rouder: 
.§, probability of forming and storing a stimulus-response association; r1 , 
probability of retrieving a stored association during free recall; fa, probability of 
retrieving a stored association during cued recall; §, probability of recalling an 
unretrieved associate as singleton. Rouder and Batchelder: .§, associative 
storage; r, associative retrieval; §, stored singleton retrieval; !J., recall of non­
associated item pairs. 
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for common items, and retrieval advantage for bizarre items 1 provides support for 
Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis. There were no significant 
differences in the unmixed-list conditions, and a significant retrieval advantage 
for bizarre items did not emerge, G2(1) = 1.14, nor did a significant storage 
advantage for common items, G2( 1 ) = 1 .16. 
Rouder-Batchelder Model Analysis 
The full version of Rouder and Batchelder's ( 1999) model contains six 
parameters with only five independent data events, which leaves no degrees of 
freedom to test t�e fit of the model_. In f�ct,_in this case, it leaves the model
unidentifiable. In _order to free up two degrees of freedom, it is possible to set 
' ' "-,, 
. 
. ..
Rouder and Batchelder's forgetting parameters to zero (i.e., f1 = f2 = 0). This 
',. •• I r 
•
leaves four parameters in the model (.§, r, §,!:!) and clears up enough degrees of 
freed om to test the fit of the model. 
Table 2 presents the loglikelihood ratio statistic G2 for the Rouder­
Batchelder (1999) model. As can be seen, the model provided mixed results. 
Good fits were found for two of the four conditions; namely, when bizarre items 
were presented in a mixed list, and when common items were presented in an 
unmixed list. But bad fits were found in the two other conditions, i.e., when 
common items were presented in a mixed list, and when bizarre items were 
presented in an unmixed list. 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for Rouder and Batchelder's 
(1999) model. The results were generally the same as Riefer and Rouder's 
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(1992) analysis in terms of the mixed-list analysis; bizarre items were retrieved 
significantly better than common items, and common items were stored 
significantly better than bizarre items. However, one pattern of results for the 
storage parameter.§. was different between the two models in the unmixed-list 
analysis. Rouder and Batchelder's model found that common items were stored 
significantly better than bizarre items when presented in an unmixed list, G2(1) = 
11.08, Q < .001, whereas Riefer and Rouder's model found no significant storage 
advantage for c��mon Jt�ms i�. the unmixed lists. 
' 
Discussion. 
The results. of Exp�rim�nt 1. provide support for Riefer and LaMay's 
(1998) two-factor hypothesis. A bizarreness effect was obtained in the mixed­
lisUfree recall condition, and by using Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial 
model, it was determined that the bizarre items were retrieved significantly better 
than common items. In addition, a commonness effect was obtained in the 
mixed-list/cued recall condition, and it was determined that the common items 
were stored significantly better than bizarre items. Taken separately, these 
findings are not unique. However, what makes these results novel and 
interesting is the fact that a retrieval advantage for bizarre items, and a storage 
advantage for common items, were found within the same experimental design. 
Riefer and Rouder ( 1992) had previously found that bizarre items are retrieved 
better, and Riefer and LaMay (1998) later found that common items are stored 
b�tter. However, these findings were the result of two separate experiments, and 
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two separate experimental designs. The possibility of obtaining a storage 
advantage for common items and a retrieval advantage for bizarre items in the 
same experimental design was only theorized, and, as Riefer and LaMay point 
out, has never been tested in a controlled study. Thus, the present study has 
now provided a framework that supports Riefer and LaMay's two factor 
hypothesis, and it is now possible to obtain both a storage advantage and a 
retrieval advantage within the same experimental design. 
The bizarreness effect has a history of elusiveness that can be seen in 
the mixed-list portion of the present experiment. It has been suggested that 
bizarre items do not always aid memory because their retrieval advantage is 
sometimes offset by the opposing storage advantage of common stimuli. The 
present experimental design was nearly identical to Riefer and Rouder (1992), 
who found a retrieval advantage for bizarre items, but did not find a storage 
advantage for common items. By reversing these variables, Riefer and LaMay 
(1998) later found a storage advantage for common items, but did not find a 
retrieval advantage for bizarre items. The remaining, non-significant, results of 
the present study support the elusive nature of the bizarreness effect. For 
instance, based on Riefer and LaMay, it would seem plausible that a 
commonness effect would imply a significant storage advantage. However, this 
was not found in the unmixed-list portion of the present study. Riefer and LaMay 
suggest that common items are recalled better in an unmixed list, which opens 
the possibility that the storage advantage for common items in an unmixed list 
may have been offset by the storage advantage for common items in a mixed 
list. 
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The interesting aspect of the present results is the support for Riefer and 
LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis. They suggest that there may be 
something inherent in the stimuli that makes bizarre items easier to retrieve and 
common items easier to store. It is clear that the novelty of bizarre items 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1987) as well as the familiarity of the common items 
(Riefer & Rouder, 1992) were apparent in the present design, and subjects were 
able to discriminate between them; However, it should be pointed out that a 
commonness effect was found overall for cued recall, in both the mixed-list and 
unmixed-list designs. This may have helped to eliminate the storage advantage 
for common items in the unmixed-list design. Further examination into the exact 
variables needed to provide this two-factor effect remain to be identified. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The second experiment examined the relationship between list-length and 
presentation rate and their overall influence on the bizarreness effect. Previous 
research has examined list length (Richman et al., 1990) and presentation rate 
(Kline & Groninger, 1991) in separate experiments, where it was determined that 
slow presentation rates (i.e., 20 s) and short list lengths (i.e., 8 items) increase 
recall, and ultimately increase the bizarreness effect. No research, to date, has 
combined list-length and presentation rate into a single experimental design to 
examine its effect on the bizarreness effect and storage and retrieval. Riefer and 
LaMay (1998) suggest that a slow presentation rate is analogous to extra study 
time, which should help to increase the storage of information (an increase in 
parameter a). With the assumption that bizarre items retain their retrieval 
advantage, this should ultimately increase the storage of bizarre items, and 
strengthen the bizarreness effect. Subjects were presented with mixed lists of 
short (10 sentences) or long (20 sentences) list-lengths, and fast (6 s) or slow 
(12 s) presentation rates. A relatively strong bizarreness effect was expected 
with a short list length and a slow presentation rate; it was also expected that the 
effect would be weakened or eliminated in the remaining conditions. 
Method 
Subjects  
Subjects consisted of 128 male and female undergraduate students from 
California State University, San Bernardino. Thirty-eight subjects were in the 
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short-list/slow rate condition, 35 subjects were in the short-list/fast rate condition, 
.27 subjects were in the long-list/slow rate condition, and 28 subjects were in the 
long-list/fast rate condition. All subjects received extra course credit for their 
participation. 
Materials 
All subjects were presented with mixed lists of common and bizarre 
sentences. Short-lists consisted of 1 O sentences, and long-lists consisted of 20 
sentences (a full set of sentences is listed in Appendix A). The short-list stimuli 
were chosen at random from the long-list items. All other aspects of the 
materials were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Design 
The experimental design was a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design. The first 
independent variable was list-length (short or long), and the second independent 
variable was presentation rate (fast or slow). Both of these were between 
subjects variables. The third independent variable was list-type (common or 
bizarre), and the fourth was type·of recall (free or cued). Both of these were 
within subjects variables. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in groups ranging from 4 to 21 people. Sentences were 
presented on slides projected onto a screen in front of subjects at a rate of 6 s 
per slide for subjects in the fast presentation rate condition, and 12 s per slide 
for subjects in the slow presentation rate condition. The remaining procedures 




Table 4 presents the fr�e and cued recall for each experimental condition. 
Items were recalled significantly better during cued recall than during free recall, 
E(1, 124) = 96.72, Q < .001. For free recall, bizarre items were recalled 
significantly better than 'common items, and for cued recall, common items were 
recalled significantly better than bizarre items. This is represented by a 
significant interaction between type of stimulus and recall test, E(1, 124) = 46.66, 
Q < .001. Shcirt�lists were rec:ali°ed significantly better than long-lists in both free 
recall and cued recall, E(1, 124) = 15.39, Q < .001. In addition, items presented at 
slow-rates were recalled significantly better than items presented at fast-rates, 
E( 1,124) = 4. 89, Q < . 05. A significant interaction emerged between presentation 
rate and recall test, E( 1,124) = 9. 95, Q < . 01, indicating that the superior recall of 
items presented at slow rates were especially strong during cued recall. 
Although most of the empirical analyses were as hypothesized, some of 
the hypothesized results failed to reach statistical significance. For instance, an 
interaction was expected between type of stimulus and type of list. Specifically, 
the bizarreness effect was expected to be strongest for short, slow lists and 
weaker or nonexistent for long, fast lists. Although a significant bizarreness 
effect was in fact found in the short-list/slow rate condition, a significant 
Table 4 
Proportion Correct for Bizarre and Common Sentences as a Function of 
Presentation Rate and List Length 
Free Recall 
Common Bizarre 
Short-LisUSlow Rate .51 (.23) .64 (.21) 







Long-LisUSlow Rate . .35 (.16) 
Long-List/Fast Rate .38 (.15) 
.40 (.17) _ . 70 (.28) .57 (.28) 
.51 (.26) .42(.16) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
.60 (.25) 
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bizarreness effect was also found in the remaining conditions, which resulted in 
non-significant interactions between type of stimuli and list length [E(1, 124) = 
1.34], and between type of stimuli and presentation rate (E < 1 ). The three-way 
interaction between type of stimuli, type of list, and presentation rate was also 
nonsignificant (E < 1 ). This indicates that the bizarreness effect remained 
consistent in each of these conditions. As it turns out, however, the effect was 
strongest in the short-list/slow rate condition, as predicted (.64 vs .. 51 ), and 
progressively grew weaker throughout the remaining conditions. For instance, 
the decrease is clear in the short-lisUfast rate condition (.55 vs . .4 7), in the long­
list/slow rate condition (.40 vs . .  35), and the advantage of bizarre stimuli was in 
fact smallest in the long-list/fast rate condition (.42 vs .. 38). 
Riefer-Rouder Model Analysis 
Table 5 presents the N
i 
data events for each condition, and the 
loglikelihood ratio statistic G2 , which was used to analyze the goodness of fit of 
Case 11 of the model. As can be seen, a good fit was found in six of the eight 
conditions. A poor fit was observed for common items when they were presented 
in a short-list/slow rate condition, and in a long-list/fast rate condition. 
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for each condition. Across all 
. 
. 
· conditions, bizarre items were retrieved S·ignificantly better than common items
� . • ... .. .. '' .. • 
t,. . "" 
!   
' • 
;ti, .. ' 't • ... • 
(as measured by ·parameter r1), G
2(4) = 18.75, Q < .001. In addition, common 
:1, 
.. � 
items were stored better than bizarre items ( as measured by parameter.§), G2( 4) 
Table 5 
NI; Recall Statistics and Goodness of Fit for Bizarre and Common Images in  
Experiment 2 for Riefer and Rouder's (R & R) (1992) and Rouder and  
Batchelder's (R & B) (1999) Multinomial Models  
G2(1) 
N1  N2 —5 N6 R&R R&B 
Short-List/Fast Rate 
Bizarre 71 . 	5 23. 20 56 0.84 3.04 
Common 69 2 42 9 51 3.22 2.35 
Short-List/Slow Rate 
Bizarre 99 7 33 2 12 37 0.65 0.56 
Common 83 4 74 0 10 19 14.11* 2.10 
Long-List/Fast Rate 
Bizarre 75 12 56 1 31 105 0.74 0.74 
Common 81 6 81 2 18 92 4.29* 0.81 
Long-List/Slow Rate 
Bizarre 78 9 66 2 17 98 0.30 1.15 
Common 77 6 104 2 8 73 1.32 3.99* 
*p < .05 
Note. N1 = both items freely recalled, correct cued recall; N2 = one and only one 
item freely recalled, correct cued recall; L31 = neither item freely recalled, correct 
cued recall; 114 = both items freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; N6 = one and 
only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; and N6 = neither item freely 
recalled, incorrect cued recall. G2(1) is the loglikelihood ratio statistic. 
Table 6 
Parameter Estimates from Experiment 2 for Riefer and Rouder's (1992)  
Multinomial Model  
a 	 -1 	 f2 
.57 
(.53 - .61) 
.66 
.72 
(.67 - .77) 
.61 
1.00 
(1.0 - 1.0) 
.97 
.24 
(.20 - .28) 
.11 
(.63- .69) (.56- .66) (.95- .99) (.08- .14) 
.75 .71 .98 .21 
(.72 - .78) (.67 - .75) (.97 - .99) (.17 - .25) 
.85 .52 1.00 .13 
(.82 - .88) (.48 - .56) (1.0 - 1.0) (.10 - .16) 
.52 .52 .99 .21 
(.49 - i55) (.48 - .56) (.98 - 1.0) (.18 - .24) 
.61 .48 .98 .12 
(.58 - .64) (.44 - .52) (.96 - 1.0) (.10 - .14) 
.58 .51 .98 .14 
(.55 - .61) (.47 - .55) (.96 - 1.0) (.12 - .16) 
.71 .41 .97 .07 













Note. Numbers in parentheses. are 95Y° confidence intervals. a, probability of 
forming and storing a stimulus-response association; r1, probability of retrieving 
a stored association during free recall; r2, probability of retrieving a stored 
association during cued recall; s, probability of recalling an unretrieved 
associate as singleton. 
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= 23.74, Q < .001. This storage advantage for common items, and retrieval 
advantage for bizarre items, is again consistent with Riefer and LaMay' s ( 1998) 
two-factor hypothesis. 
A storage-retrieval analysis can also be conducted on the other variables 
in this experiment. An analysis of list length revealed that short lists were 
retrieved significantly better than long lists, G2(4) = 30. f6, Q < .001. Short lists 
were also generally stored better than long lists G2(4) = 26.27, Q < .001, 
although this difference was strongest in slow presentation rates. An analysis of 
presentation rate indicates that items presented at slow rates were stored 
significantly better than items presented at fast rates, G2(4) = 36.66, Q < .001. 
However, presentation rate had no significant effect on the retrieval para_meter 
L, G2(4) = 429, ns. 
Rouder-Batchelder Model Analysis 
Table 5 shows the goodness of fit for Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) 
model. Acceptable fits were found in seven of the eight conditions. The only bad 
fit was found when common items in a long list were presented at a slow rate. 
The parameter estimates, shown in Table 7, were comparable to the ones from 
the Riefer-Rouder model, and all statistical analyses were also the same. For 
instance, Rouder ·and Batchelder's model also indicated that bizarre items were 
retrieved significantly better than common items, and that common items were 
stored significantly better than bizarre items. Short lists were retrieved and also 
stored significantly better than long lists. Finally, items presented at a slow rate 
Table 7 
Parameter Estimates from Experiment 2 for Rouder and Batchelder's (1999)  






.57 	.71 	.10 	.13 
(.53 - .61) 	(.66 - .76) 	(.06 - .14) 	(.10 - .16) 
.65 .61 .02 	.11 







(.70 - .76) 
.85 
(.82 - .88) 
.51 
.71 
(.67 - .75) 
.52 





(.02 - .04) 
.10 
.16 
(.12 - .20) 
.17 
(.12 - .22) 
.12 
(.48 - .54) (.48 - .56) (.07 - .13) (.10 - .14) 
Common .60 -.48 .36 .10 
(.57- .63) (.44 - .52) (.35 - .37) (.08- .12) 
Long-List/Slow Rate 
Bizarre .57 .51 .06 .09 
(.54 - .60) (.47 - .55) (.04 - .08) (.07 - .11) 
Common .69 .41 .03 .07 
(.66- .72) (.37 - .45) (.02 - .04) (.05 - .09) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. a, associative 
storage; r, associative retrieval; s, stored singleton retrieval; u, recall of non-
associated item pairs. 
were stored significantly better than items presented at a fast rate, with no 
significant effects on retrieval. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 provide further support for Riefer and 
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LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis. Across conditions, bizarre items 
increased. retrieval and common items increased storage. It was expected that 
the strongest bizarreness effect would emerge when short lists were presented 
at a slow presentation rate. A reliable bizarreness effect was, in fact, found in the 
short-lisUslow rate condition, although it also emerged across the remaining 
conditions. However, the effect was strongest in the short-lisUslow rate 
condition, and it progressively grew weaker througho.ut the remaining conditions. 
The trend was clearly in the right direction, even if it was not statistically 
significant. 
An expected result also emerged in the examination of presentation rate, 
in that information presented at a slow rate increased storage but not retrieval 
(cf. Batchelder & Riefer, 1980). This result is consistent with another study by 
Riefer and Batchelder (1987), who presented stimuli at 2 s and 5 s presentation 
rates. Using a different multinomial model, they found that items presented at a 5 
s rate were stored better than items at a 2 s rate. They also found no significant 
•    ,, 
effects of presentation rate ·on retrieval. These results are the same as the 
!   
present results, using a diff�rent paradigm "and model. 
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Another interesting finding was the effect that short lists had on storage 
and retrieval. Short lists were stored better than long lists, which is theoretically 
reasonable because presenting subjects with a short list of stimuli allows them to 
focus more of their attention and rehearsal on each individual item. Just the 
opposite is true, however, for long lists. The excess information presented in a 
long list may provide so much information that it is hard to process all of it at one 
time, and thus makes the information more difficult to store. The model also 
revealed that short lists were retrieved better than long lists. This result is also 
intuitively plausible, and can be explained in nearly the same terms as the 
storage explanation. For instance, in a short list of stimuli there is less 
information to encode and recall, Which would make each individual item easier 
to retrieve from memory. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 examines level of association and how it impacts the 
bizarreness effect. An experiment by Lang (1995) found that high-associate 
stimuli increase· the free recall of bizarre items, while low-associate stimuli 
increase free recall for common items. It is expected that the present study will 
replicate Lang's findings; a bizarreness effect should be found in the high-
. associate condition, and a commonness effect should be found in the low­
associate condition. According to Riefer and LaMay (1998), high-levels of 
association enhance storage of bizarre stimuli relative to common stimuli (which 
are already stored well). This suggests that high-associate items actually serve 
to reduce the storage advantage for common stimuli, without effecting the 
retrieval advantage of bizarre stimuli; thus strengthening the bizarreness effect. 
The current experiment provides an opportunity to explore an experiment 
conducted by Hirshmar:, (1988, �xperiment 1 ). Similar to this experiment, 
I, 
'", ·• � 
Hirshman examined various.factors that effect level of association, and 
1 
discovered an -interesting interaction between level of association and type of 
' 
• . • 'lo --. � �, ", 
recall test. Specifically, he found that low associates are recalled better than 
high associates in free r.ecall, but that high associates are recalled better than 
low associates in cued recall. Hirshman theorized that low associates are 
retrieved better than high associates in free recall because the stimuli, which are 
unexpected and novel, block access to the high-associate items. This is a 
retrieval-based explanation that can easily be explored using the Riefer-Rouder 
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model of storage and retrieval. The present study will therefore use Riefer and 
Rouder's model to explore this aspect of Hirshman's findings. Consistent with 
Hirshman's results, we expect to see a recall advantage for low associates 
during free recall, and an advantage for high associates for cued recall. Once 
Riefer and Rouder's model is applied to the data we will be able· to use the 
storage and retrieval parameters to help explain this finding. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects consisted of 69 male and female undergraduate students 
from California State University, San B�rnardino. All subjects received extra 
course credit for their participation. 
Materials 
All-subjects were presented with. 12 sentences consisting of three 
�. 
·., ' • � �' ;. ' ... � ] ·� 
't 
exemplars of each of the four con,qitions:. high associate, common; high
associate, bizarre; low associate, common; and low associate, bizarre. The 
presentation order was randomized with some minor constraints. For instance, 
no more than two sentences from the same context ( common or bizarre), or 
association level (high or low), were presented consecutively. Two versions of 
the common and bizarre sentences were presented; version 1 consisted of the 
original randomized version of common and bizarre sentences, and version 2 
consisted of its reversal, in which the common sentences in version 1 were the 
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bizarre sentences in version 2. Thirty-six subjects received the original order of 
the stimuli (version 1 ), and 33 subjects received its reversal (version 2). 
Each sentence containe� a noun-pair (e.g., GOLDFISH-BOWL) which 
described a common or bizarre and a high or low association between the items. 
An example of a common sentence with a high _association is 'The GOLDFISH 
was swimming in the BOWL;' its corresponding bizarre sentence is 'The 
GOLDFISH was eating out of the BOWL.' An example of common sentence with 
a low association is 'The SPIDER crawled on the SIDEWALK;' its corresponding 
bizarre sentence is 'The SPIDER watered the SIDEWALK.' Noun-pairs were 
� ' . .




those use� by McDaniel and Einstein (1986), Riefer and LaMay (1998), and 
' 
Riefer and Rouder (1992). A full set of sentences is listed in Appendix A. 
Design 
The experimental design was a 2 X 2 X 2 within factorial design. The first 
independent variable was sentence type ( common or bizarre), the second 
independent variable was type of recall (free or cued), and the third independent 
variable was level of association (high or low). 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in two groups consisting of 36 and 33 people. The 
procedures were exactly l,ike those used in Experiment 1. 
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Results 
Empirical Analysis  
Table 8 shows the proportion of correct recall for common and bizarre 
items in each condition. An ANOVA revealed that subjects recalled significantly 
more items in cued recall than in free recall, F(1,68) = 66.17, 2 < .01. In free 
recall, low associates were recalled better than high associates, but in cued 
recall, high associates were recalled better than low associates. This interaction 
between level of association and recall test was significant, F(1,68) = 20.57, p < 
.01 However, the interaction between level of association and level of 
bizarreness was not significant (F < 1), indicating a consistent bizarreness effect 
for the both high and low associates. A significant interaction between type of 
stimulus and type of recall emerged, which indicates that in free recall, bizarre 
items were recalled significantly better than common items, and in cued recall, 
common items were recalled significantly better than bizarre items, F(1,68) = 
19.48, j< .01. 
Riefer-Rouder Model Analysis  
Table 9 presents the NJ; data events and the loglikelihood ratio statistic G2 
for each condition of the experiment. As can be seen, a good fit was found in 
three of the four conditions. A poor fit was observed only for low-associate 
common items. Table 10 presents the parameter estimates for each condition. 
Bizarre items were retrieved significantly better than common items, 
[G2(2) = 21.40,,2 < .001], and common items were stored significantly better than 
Table 8 





· Common Bizarre 
.45 (.32) .58 (.33) 
.56 (.29) .67 (.27) 




.85 (.28) .80 (.29) 
.83 (.27) .77 (.30) 
Table 9 
Ni Recall Statistics and Goodness of Fit for Bizarre and Common Images in 
Experiment 3 for Riefer and Rouder's (R & R) (1992) and Rouder and 
Batchelder's (R & B) (1999) Multinomial Models 
G2{1) 
N1 N2 � & Ns Ns R&R R&B 
High-Associate 
Bizarre 99 7 59 5 8 29 2.23 6.90* 
Common 82 1 93 5 2 24 2.88 16.66* 
Low-Associate 
Bizarre 118 5· 35 4 10 35 1.40 4.23* 
Common 92 5 73 6 8 23 7.12* 7.07* 
*Q < .05
.. 
Note. N1 = both items freely re�alled, correct cued recall; N2 = one and only one 
' ,. . . "' 
item freely recalled, correct cued recall;�= neither item freely recalled, correct 
cued recall; � = both items freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; Ns = one and 
only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; and N6 = neither item freely 
recalled, incorrect cued recall. G2(1) is the loglikelihood ratio statistic. 
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(.76 - .82) 
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-(.83 - 87) 
.76, 
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Parameter Estimates from Experiment 3 for Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and  
Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) Multinomial_Models  
Riefer & Rouder 	a 	 r2 
High-Associate 
Bizarre 	 .84 
(.81 - .87) 
Common 	.91 








(.91 - .97) 
.15 
(.12 - .18) 
.03 
(.02 - .04) 
Low-Associate 
Bizarre 	 .79 	.75 	.97 	.18 
(.76- .82) 
	










(.91 - .97) 
	
(.09- .15) 
Rouder & Batchelder 	a 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Riefer and Rouder: 
a, probability of forming and storing a stimulus-response association; r1, 
probability of retrieving a stored association during free recall; r2, probability of 
retrieving a stored association during cued recall; s, probability of recalling an 
unretrieved associate as singleton. Rouder and Batchelder: a, associative 
storage; r, associative retrieval; s, stored singleton retrieval; u, recall of non-
associated item pairs. 
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bizarre items, [G2(2) = 7.35, Q < .01 ], for both the high and low associates. 
Further analysis indicated that low-associate iterr,s were retrieved significantly 
better than high-associate items, G2(2) = 9.92, Q < .01. High-associate items 
were also stored better than low-associate items; however, this difference failed 
to reach statistical significance, G2(2) = 1. 92. 
Rouder-Batchelder Model Analysis 
Table 9 presents the goodness of fit for Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) 
model. The fit for Experiment 3 was not very good, with poor fits found in all four 
experimental conditions. Table 10 shows the parameter estimates for Rouder 
and Batchelder's model. Results of the hypothesis tests indicate that, like the 
I( ·, ... , • � 1 ·• 
• 
·• '\1 
Riefer-Rouder model, bizarre items "Y.ere retrieved significantly better than 
common items. Unlike the Riefe�-�oude  model, however, the storage 
' \ � J. 
i ,A.- •• t t('\.   
advantage for common items failed to reach statistical significance, G2(2) = 4.13, 
ns. Further analyses indicated that low associates were retrieved significantly 
better than high associates. In addition, high associates were stored better than 
low associates, but similar to the Riefer-Rouder model, this difference also failed 
to reach statistical significance. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 indicate that, for free recall; bizarre items 
were recalled significantly better than common items, and for. cued recall, 
common items were recalled better than bizarre items. Riefer and Rouder's 
(1992) multinomial model also indicated that the bizarre items were retrieved 
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better than the common items, and the common items were stored better than 
the bizarre items. Differences in storage and retrieval were also found in level of 
association, which indicated that high associates were stored better, and low 
associates were retrieved better. 
The present results replicate Hirshman (1988, Experiment 1), who found 
that low associates are recalled better than high associates in free recall, but 
that high associates are recalled better in cued recall. Hirshman framed his 
results in terms of a retrieval-interference hypothesis, by suggesting that the 
retrieval of low-associate items blocks the retrieval of high-associate items. 
According to Hirshman, low-associate items are harder to understand, which 
makes it difficult to identify the relation between the noun-pairs. The novelty of 
these items block the retrieval of high-associate items, which are more familiar to 
subjects. The memory of the response to the unexpected stimuli should make 
them easier to retrieve - - a plausible retrieval-based explanation for low-
associate items. 
The purpose of the present study was to examine high and low associates 
and their effect on storage and retrieval processes. By using Riefer and 
Rouder's (1992) multinomial model, it was determined that low associates are 
retrieved better, which supports previous research by Hirshman (1988). 
However, the present study expanded this finding, and also suggests that high 
associates are stored better. This also supports previous research by Batchelder 
and Riefer (1980), who examined clusterable pairs of high and low associates, 
and found that high associates were stored better than low associates. 
Batchelder and Riefer suggest that when noun pairs (i.e., clusters) are stored, 
, they lose their individual identity, and are stored not as a pair, but as a unitary 
item. This· implies that retrieval of the associate items is an all or nothing 
proposition, which provides a plausible explanation for the increased recall of 
high associates in cued recall. 
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These findings are reminiscent of previous research on the bizarreness 
effect, which suggests that bizarre items are easier to recall due to their novelty 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1987). Hirshman (1988) provided a link between these 
previous findings and the present study. He suggests that bizarre items and low 
associates share some similarities. For instance, it is well established that 
bizarre items are retrieved better be�ause of their novelty. The same can be said 
for ·low-a�sociate items; their lack of �ccessibility, and their unexpected nature, 
may provoke a surprise response from subjects (Hirshman, Whelley, & Palij, 
1989). Thus, like bizarre items, low associates are easier to retrieve, which 
explains why both are recalled better in free recall. A similar link can be found 
between, common items and high associates. For instance, many experiments 
have found that common items are recalled better in cued recall; in turn, 
Hirshman (1988) observed that high associates are recalled better in cued 
recall. In addition, the analysis by Riefer and Rouder's (1992) multinomial model 
reveals that both common items and high associates benefit from higher storage. 
Although the present study replicated Hirshman's relationship between bizarre 
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items and low associates, the present study was able to analyze them in terms of 
storage and retrieval processes. The importance of these findings is that they 
not only replicated Hirshman, but a link between low associates and bizarre 
items and high associates and common items was also found in a single study. 
Specifically, both low associates and bizarre items benefit retrieval, and high 
associates and common items benefit storage. These results are consistent with 
previous theories (Hirshman, 1988; Hirshman et al., 1989; Riefer & Rouder, 
1992), and they provide a two-factor hypothesis for high and low associates. 
This is a novel finding which suggests that low associates increase retrieval, and 
high associates increase storage. 
Although the present study replicated Hirshman's (1988) Experiment 1, 
Lang's (1995) results were not supported. The current experiment did not find a 
significant interaction between level of association and the bizarreness effect. 
Instead, an advantage for bizarre items emerged for both high and low 
associates. This result is contrary to Lang, who found a bizarreness effect for 
high associates, but a commonness effect for low associates. The differences 
between the present study and Lang's (1995) study may lie in the different 
methods used. For instance, the present study presented subjects with noun-
pairs embedded within common and bizarre sentences. Lang's research, 
however, is based on noun-triads embedded in common and bizarre sentences. 
Although no study has examined the direct effects of presenting subjects with 
noun-pairs vs. noun-triads, Lang's use of noun-triads may have contributed to 
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her findings. Noun-triads, as opposed to noun-pairs, provide subjects with 
additional information which may have made the high associates more difficult to 
store. It is possible, however, that the bizarreness effect found by Lang was 
simply weaker than the bizarreness effect foUnd in the present study. The 
present study had a significant bizarreness effect that was found in all 
conditions. 
The difference between the present results and Lang's (1995) study may 
also be due to the nature of the stimuli; specifically, there may have been subtle 
inconsistencies between the high and low associate distinction. No pilot studies 
were conducted to determine a consistent measure of high and low associate 
items, and the difference between the items may have varied between subjects. 
For instance, the noun-pair WOLF-MOON, which was used as a low associate in 
the present study, could also be considered a high associate depending on a 
subjects own experience. Thus, it is clear that the stimuli may not have provided 
a strong enough differentiation between high and low associates. If so, this may 
explain why a consistent bizarreness effect was not observed for both types of 
stimuli. 
Another possibility is that the present results may not be inconsistent with 
those of Lang (1995). Instead, they may simply point out the complex interplay 
between storage and retrieval processes in the bizarreness effect. For instance, 
Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis already describes a 
complicated effect of storage and retrieval on the bizarreness effect, saying that 
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common items are stored better and bizarre items are retrieved better. However, 
this interactive relationship between storage and retrieval becomes even more ' 
complex when it is combined with different levels of association. This is because 
level of association also has a complicated effect on storage and retrieval, with 
high associates stored better and low associates retrieved better. Hirshman 
(1988) found that low associates, like bizarre items, are remembered better in 
free recall and that high associates, like common items, ,are remembered better 
in cued recall. 
A myriad of different combinations of these variables can produce 
different effects on storage and retrieval parameters, and add to an already 
complex relationship between bizarre and common stimuli. Depending on the 
levels of storage and retrieval, one could observe the interaction between level 
of association and bizarreness found in Lang's (1995) experiment. But different 
levels of storage and retrieval could also have produced the pattern of results 
found in the current experiment, which observed significant bizarreness effects 
for both high and low associates. The experiments reported in this thesis utilized 
every procedure known to strengthen the bizarreness effect, including vividness 
ratings and an incidental learning paradigm. It is possible that by varying the 
degree and interplay among different variables (e.g., more difficult items, a 
different presentation rate, or an intentional learning task), a weaker bizarreness 
effect or even a commonness effect may be the result. If so, then under these 
conditions, Lang's results may have been replicated. 
'
EXPERIMENT 4 
The final experiment examined sentence complexity and how it impacts 
the bizarreness effect. Research has shown that the mnemonic benefit of 
bizarreness is not found in complex sentences. Instead, a recall advantage for 
bizarre imagery is evident when the sentences are relatively simple, and free of 
the extra noun modifiers apparent in complex sentences (McDaniel & Einstein, 
1989). It has been suggested that the impoverished encodings of simple 
sentences cause subjects to rely on the bizarreness of the stimuli as a retrieval 
cue, which produces a bizarreness effect. This is in contrast to complex 
sentences, which have more specific retrieval cues embedded within them to 
help subjects recall the target noun. This reduces the need for subjects to rely 
on bizarre information to retrieve the items and thus eliminates the bizarreness 
effect. This is a retrieval-based explanation for the effects of sentence 
complexity, one that is easily tested using Riefer and Rouder's (1992) 
multinomial model. The present study examined sentence complexity by 
presenting subjects with lists of simple or complex sentences. As in previous 
research, a bizarreness effect is expected to emerge for simple sentences, but 
not for complex sentences. A retrieval advantage (measured by retrieval 
parameter r1 ) should emerge when subjects are presented with bizarre stimuli 
embedded within simple sentences, and should· be neutralized when subjects 





Subjects consisted of 79 male and female undergraduate students from 
California State University, San Bernardino. Thirty-eight subjects were in the 
simple sentence condition, and 41 subjects were in the complex sentence 
condition. All subjects received extra course credit for their participation. 
Materials  
Each subject received either 12 simple sentences (6 common and 6 
bizarre) or 12 complex sentences (6 common and 6 bizarre). Simple sentences 
were the same as those used in Experiment 1. Complex sentences consisted of 
the same noun-pairs as the simple sentences, with the addition of extra noun-
modifiers. An example of a complex sentence using the noun-pair BANKER 
NEWSPAPER is Thestately BANKER read the rain-soaked NEWSPAPER,' and 
its corresponding bizaere Sentence is 'The stately BANKER floated on the rain-
soaked NEWSPAPER'. All sentences were completely counterbalanced, so that 
sentences in each condition were presented equally to subjects in both common 
and bizarre formats. In addition, no more than two sentences of the same type 
(i.e., common or bizarre) were presented consecutively. A full set of sentences is 
listed in Appendix A. 
Design  
The experimental design was a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed design. The first 
independent variable was sentence type (common or bizarre), which was a 
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within subjects variable. The second independent variable was type of recall 
(free or cued), which was also a within subjects variable. The third independent 
variable was sentence complexity (complex or simple), which was the between-
subjects variable. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in sessions consisting of 1 to 15 people. Subjects were 
presented with 12 simple or 12 complex sentences. The remaining procedures 
were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Empirical Analysis  
Table 11 shows the proportion of sentences correctly recalled for simple 
and complex sentences. Simple sentences were recalled significantly better than 
complex sentences for both free and cued recall, F(1,77) = 28.08, 2 < 01. In 
addition, items tested with cued recall were recalled significantly better than 
items tested with free recall, F(1,77) = 44.51, < .01. Although only a slight 
bizarreness effect emerged in the free recall condition, a larger commonness 
effect was found for cued recall+, 'especially in complex sentences. This 
difference, hoWeV'er, failed fo reach statisiiCal significance (F < 1). A significant 
recall x list interaction emergbd, which indicated that the recall advantage of 
cued recall over free recall was stronger for simple sentences, F (1,77) = 15.38, 
<.01. A significant stimuli x recall interaction also emerged, suggesting that 
only slightly more bizarre items were recalled during free recall, but that 
Free Recall 	 Cued Recall  
Common Bizarre Common Bizarre 
Simple Sentences 
Complex Sentences 
.50 (.19) 	.53 (.17) 
.36 (.24) 	.38 (.24) 
.76 (.29) 	.75 (.29) 
.48 (.30) 	.39 (.25) 
Table 11 
Proportion Correct for Bizarre and Common Stimuli in Simple and Complex 
Sentences  
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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significantly' more common items were recalled during cued recall, F (1,77) = 
.5.25, p. < .05. Finally, the stimuli x list interaction failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(1,77) = 1.19, ns. 
Riefer-Rouder Model Analysis  
Table 12 presents the recall statistics and goodness of fit for the Riefer-
Rouder (1992) model for the simple and complex sentences. As can be seen, a 
good fit was found in all four conditions. Table 13 presents the parameter 
estimates for each condition. There was a significant difference between simple 
and complex items in parameter a, indicating that simple sentences were stored 
significantly better than complex sentences, G2(2) = 105.99, p. < .001. A retrieval 
advantage failed to emerge between simple and complex sentences, G2(2) = 
2.92, ns. Neither a storage advantage, G2(2) = 2.53, ns, nor a retrieval 
advantage, G2(2) = 0.70, ns, emerged between common and bizarre items in 
simple and complex sentencee. 
Rouder-Batchelder Model Analysis  
Table 12 presents the recall statistics and goodness of fit for the Rouder-
Batchelder (1999) model. As can be seen, a good fit was found in three of the 
four experimental conditions. The only bad fit was found when bizarre items 
were presented in simple sentences. Table 13 presents the parameter estimates 
for the Rouder-Batchelder model, which are comparable to those found with the 
Riefer-Rouder model. All statistical analyses revealed the same pattern of 
results as those found in the Riefer-Rouder model. For instance, simple 
Table 12 
Ni Recall Statistics and Goodness of Fit for Bizarre and Common Images in  
Experiment 4 for Riefer and Rouder's (R & R) (1992) and Rouder and  
Batchelder's (R & B) (1999) Multinomial Models.  
G2(1) 







99 9 67 5 8 40 0.57 9.12* 
96 6 72 2 9 43 2.76 1.91 
50 10 37 2 26 121 0.30 0.18 
53 6 56 1 26 104 3.49 0.22 
*p <.05 
Note. N1 = both items freely recalled, correct cued recall; N2 = one and only one 
item freely recalled, correct cued recall; N5 = neither item freely recalled, correct 
cued recall; N4 = both items freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; N6 = one and 
only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall; and N6 = neither item freely 
recalled, incorrect cued recall. G2(1) is the loglikelihood ratio statistic. 
Table 13 
Parameter Estimates from Experiment 4 for Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and  










(.51 - .59) 
.52 
.95 
(.93 - .97) 
.98 
(.97 - .99) 
.96 
.14 
(.11 	- .17) 
.12 
(.09 - .15) 
.19 
(.38- .44) (.47 - .57) (.93 - .99) (.16 - .22) 
.48 .46 .98 .17 
(.45 - .51) (.41 -.51) (.96 - 1.0) (.14 - .20) 
a 
.77 .56 .06 .17 
(.74 - .80) (.52 - .60) (.04 - .08) (.14 - .20) 
.76 .55 .04 .12 
(.73 - .79) (.51 - .59) (.02 - .06) (.09 - .15) 
.39 .51 .12 .10 
(.36 - .42) (.46 - .56) (.08 - .16) (.08 - .12) 
.47 .46 .05 .11 
(.44 - .50) (.41 - .51) (.03 - 07) (.09 - .13) 














Note. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Riefer and Rouder: 
a, probability of forming and storing a stimulus-response association; 
probability of retrieving a stored association during free recall; r2, probability of 
retrieving a stored association during cued recall; s, probability of recalling an 
unretrieved associate as singleton. Rouder and Batchelder: a, associative 
storage; r, associative retrieval; s, stored singleton retrieval; u, recall of non-
associated item pairs. 
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sentences were stored significantly better than complex sentences, but a 
retrieval advantage failed to emerge between simple and complex sentences. In 
addition, as with the Riefer-Rouder model, neither a storage advantage nor a 
retrieval advantage emerged between common and bizarre items in either 
simple or ·complex sentences. 
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 4 failed to show a bizarreness effect for simple 
sentences, or for that matter for complex sentences. Although a bizarreness 
effect was expected, without it, it is impossible to determine whether the 
bizarreness effect is due to storage or retrieval processes. Robinson-Riegler and 
McDaniel (1994) examined sentence complexity, and hypothesized that complex 
sentences are retrieved better than simple sentences. They suggested that 
complex sentences serve to elaborate the target nouns, which makes them 
easier to retrieve. But complex sentences not only increase the elaboration of 
common sentence; they increase the elaboration of bizarre sentences as well. 
Therefore, Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel theorized that the retrieval cues 
associated with complexity are more salient and precise than the retrieval cues 
associated with bizarrenes·s: and,thus th� �ues associated with complexity 
. dominate d�ririgiretrievaT.,, . . . . 'l!·. ,: . 
, . •  , . ...
,-- ... . - .. •' ' t 
Without the expected empirical results, it was impossible to test these 
. . 
hypotheses. However, there were some interesting results that allow for some 
speculation as to the effect of sentence complexity on bizarre and common 
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sentences. Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel (1994) provided a retrieval-based 
explanation for sentence complexity, stating that complex sentences lead to 
better retrieval. In the current experiment, however, there is no evidence to 
suggest, that complex sentences are better retrieved. In fact, just the opposite 
was found; the multinomial model analysis revealed that simple sentences are 
stored better, with no differences in retrieval between simple and complex 
sentences. 
It is clear that Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel's (1994) results were not 
replicated. However, the literature is mixed as to the effect of complex and 
simple sentences on memory. For instance, Kline and Groninger (1991) 
examined sentence complexity, and also manipulated presentation rate by 
allowing either a 3, 5, or 7 s processing time for simple sentences, and an 11, 
15, or 20 s processing time for complex sentences. This difference in 
presentation time for simple and complex sentences was based on the 
assumption that complex sentences take longer to process than simple 
sentences. Because of this, Kline and Groninger found a recall advantage for 
complex sentences.,Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel (1974) also found a recall 
advantage for comlex'sentende, by giving subjects an unlimited amount of 
time to process both complex and simple sentences. Presumably, the more 
complex sentences received longer processing. In contrast, McDaniel and 
Einstein (1989) examined sentence complexity but presented subjects with a 
constant 11 s presentation rate for both simple and complex sentences. Contrary 
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to Kline and Groninger, but similar to the results of Experiment 4, McDaniel and 
Einstein found a recall advantage for simple sentences. 
What is clear is that presentation rate seems to be an important factor 
when measuring the recall for simple or complex sentences. The question can 
then be asked: Does presentation rate effect the storage or retrieval of complex 
sentences? As it turns out, the results of Experiment 2 provide an answer to that 
question. It was shown in Experiment 2 that a slow presentation rate increases 
storage of items but has no effect on their retrieval. We see, then, that the result 
of the model's analysis reveals that simple sentences are stored better than 
complex sentences, and that presentation rate, an important factor in sentence 
complexity, also affects storage and not retrieval. These findings tend to be 
contrary to the retrieval-based explanation of sentence complexity proposed by 
Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel. 
Thus, it is possible to offer an alternative explanation for the role of 
sentence complexity in the bizarreness effect, one that posits a storage-based 
explanation. It is reasonable to assume that, because of the absence of extra 
noun modifiers, simple sentences are stored better than complex sentences. 
This is partially based on the same hypotheses discussed in Experiment 2, 
which state that, when stimuli are simple in nature, this allows them generally to 
be stored better. However, the influence of storage processes on the 
bizarreness effect cannot be discussed without addressing the nature of the 
bizarreness effect. Most previous research has established that the bizarreness 
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effect is often quite elusive and fragile. However, its fragile nature can be 
strengthened or weakened by different combinations of storage and retrieval. 
Specifically, stimuli that help storage (e.g., simple sentences) also tend to help 
bizarre items due to the fact that bizarre stimuli tend to be weak on storage in 
general. But this also means that stimuli that hurt storage (e.g., complex 
sentences) also hurt bizarre items relative to common items. If complex 
sentences serve to further weaken the fragile storage of bizarre items, this could 
weaken or even eliminate the bizarreness effect. 
The hypothesis presented above is a storage-based explanation for 
sentence complexity and the bizarreness effect that stands in contrast to the 
retrieval-based explanation posited by Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel (1994). 
Unfortunately, nothing in the present results allows us to differentiate between 
these two competing hypotheses. An interesting extension to this research, 
however, would be to systematically examine the effects of presentation rate on 
sentence complexity in a single factorial design. It is clear that presentation rate 
is an important factor in how sentence complexity influences the bizarreness 
effect. Prior research addressing sentence complexity and presentation rate has 
an inherent confound that needs to be eliminated, i.e., the extra study time 
necessary to process complex sentences. By manipulating sentence complexity 
and presentation rate factorially, and by applying the multinomial model, future 
research on this issue should be better able to reveal the relative contribution of 
storage and retrieval factors. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study was designed to examine the Validity and predictive 
ability of Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis. The locus of the two-
factor hypothesis lies in the relationship between the bizarreness effect and 
storage and retrieval processes. Riefer and LaMay suggest that the combined 
effect of storage and retrieval may produce a bizarreness effect, but may also 
produce a commonness effect; depending on the relative contribution of storage 
and retrieval. By manipulating several variables that influence the bizarreness 
effect, the present study was able to apply the two-factor hypothesis to such 
variables as mixed and unmixed lists, list-length, presentation rate, level of 
association, and sentence complexity. The goal was to examine how these 
variables influence the bizarreness effect and the role that storage and retrieval 
processes play in explaining the results. 
Riefer and LaMay's Two-Factor Hypothesis  
Riefer and LaMay (1998) have pointed out that a limitation of past 
imagery research was the inability to obtain a storage advantage for common 
imagery and retrieval advantage of bizarre imagery in a single experimental 
design. For instance, in. a study. examining the commonness effect, Riefer and 
LaMay found only a storage advantage for commonitems. In a separate study 
examining the bizarreness effect, Riefer and Rouder (1992) found only a 
retrieval advantage for bizarre items. This limitation in prior research has now 
been eliminated in the present series of studies - - both aspects Of the two-factor 
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hypothesis have now been demonstrated in a single experiment. In fact, the two-
factor hypothesis was fully supported in three of the four experiments. Perhaps 
the best example of the two-factor hypothesis was found in the examination of 
mixed-lists and unmixed-lists in Experiment 1. Riefer and LaMay (1998) 
surmised that if something inherent within the stimuli makes common items 
easier to store, and bizarre items easier to retrieve, then it should be possible to 
obtain both a storage advantage for common items and a retrieval advantage for 
bizarre items within the same experimental design. This was the task that 
experimenters have attempted to accomplish, and it was done in Experiment 1 in 
a very straightforward and interpretable manner. 
Support for a two-factor theory is also evident in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Specifically, the two-factor hypothesis emerged in the examination of list-length 
and presentation rate, where common items increased storage and bizarre items 
increased retrieval across all experimental conditions. The two-factor hypothesis 
was also confirmed when level of association was examined. The only 
experiment that failed to confirm the two-factor hypothesis was Experiment 4, 
which examined sentence complexity. However, this was not due to a weakness 
in Riefer and Rouder's (1992) model or in the two-factor hypothesis itself. 
Instead, it was due to the failure to obtain a bizarreness effect in that 
experiment. Without an initial bizarreness effect, Riefer and Rouder's model 
could not determinelhe effect of storage and retrieval on sentence complexity. 
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Predictions Concerning the Bizarreness Effect 
Although Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis faired well in 
the present study, the same cannot be said for the basic predictions for the 
bizarreness effect. For instance, the bizarreness effect defied predictions in 
Experiment 2, where a bizarreness effect was expected only in the short-list/slow 
rate condition. However, the bizarreness effect was so reliable, that it was not 
only found in this condition, but it was also found across all the other conditions. 
The predicted weakening or elimination of the bizarreness effect with larger lists 
and faster presentation rates simply did not occur. A similar failure was found in 
the examination of high and low associates in Experiment 3, where it was 
predicted that a bizarreness effect would emerge with high-associate items, but 
not with low-associate items. A bizarreness effect was, in fact, found for high 
associates, but a significant bizarreness effect was found for low-associate items 
as well. It appears the variables manipulated in Experiments 2 and 3 made the 
bizarreness effect so reliable that it was found in all conditions; even in 
conditions where it was not expected to appear. 
Experiment 4, which examined sentence complexity, provided perhaps the 
furthest deviation from the hypothesized predictions. It was hypothesized that a 
bizarreness effect would emerge for simple sentences and not for complex 
sentences. However, a bizarreness effect failed to emerge, not only for complex 
sentences, but for simple sentences as well. What is particularly puzzling is that, 
even though a bizarreness effect was not found for the simple sentences in 
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Experiment 4, these sentences were identical to those used in Experiments 1 
and 2, and nearly identical to those used in Experiment 3. And yet reliable 
bizarreness effects were found in all of these other experiments. The 
discrepancy between the results of Experiments 4 and the other experiments 
remains a mystery; however, it doesn't come as a complete surprise. There is 
some precedence for these types of mixed results in the literature. For example, 
the present results are reminiscent of Riefer and Rouder's (1992) study where 
they used the same experimental manipulations, and nearly identical stimuli as 
the present study, but found a bizarreness effect in only two of their three 
studies. Thus, even though the same set of stimuli was used in several 
experiments, the bizarreness effect was not always observed. It should be noted 
that in the present study, the differences between the proportions for common 
items and bizarre items were fairly small throughout the four experiments 
presented in this study. All of this serves to remind us of the delicate balance 
between the variables known to obtain a bizarreness effkct, and their ability to 
r:./ 1 , • •. ;,
> : 
actually qbtain a bizarreness effect acn;,ss different experimental manipulations. 
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experiment, it is also important to consider the issue of variability. It is quite 
possible that variability in the data was_ a factor in several of the between­
subjects designs, especially those that failed to obtain the hypothesized results 
(i.e., Experiments 2 and 4). To examine variability, it is common to look at the 
standard deviations provided by the empirical analy�es. For instan�e, the 
standard deviations for list-length and presentation rate (see Table 4) range 
o 








sentence complexity (see Table 11 ), where the standard deviations range from 
.17 to .24. All of these indicate a wide variability in the results. The variability in 
the current experiments may also be due to a lack of control over some of the 
variables presented to facilitate a bizarreness effect. For instance, as stated 
previously, in Experiment 3 the various levels of association may not have been 
strong enough to determine the actual differences between high and low 
associates. A pilot study to determine the strength of the association, in which 
the levels of association are rated for degree of association between noun-pairs, 
is recommended for future research. 
It is therefore quite possible that some of the inconsistencies found in the 
bizarreness effect may have been the result of the high variability inherent in 
between-subjects designs. An interesting extension to this research would be to 
manipulate several of these variables (e.g., simple and complex sentences, or 
fast.and slow presentation rates) and, instead of using a between-subjects 
design as in the current series of studies, test them by using a within-subjects or 
repeated-measures design. Although this is plausible, it may also be 
problematic. For instance, by presenting subjects with stimuli in a within-subjects 
design, the incidental learning paradigm, which facilitates a bizarreness effect, is 
lost. This is because subjects would need to see multiple lists of words in a 
repeated measures, which would necessitate informing them that their 
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memory of the lists is to be tested multiple times . .However, it may be possible, 
using some combination of factors, to get a reliable bizarreness effect in an 
intentional learning paradigm, where subjects are forewarned of the impending 
memory task. If so, then experiments could be conducted in which subjects are 
presented with multiple lists of stimuli in a within-subject design. 
Assessing the Validity of the Models 
Another major goal of the present study was to explore the validity of 
Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) multinomial 
models as tools for measuring storage and retrieval. One way to measure the 
validity of a model is to determine whether the parameter estimates provide an 
acclJrate assessment of the variables that they 'are designed to measure. For 
instance, if a model Js designed to measure storage and retrieval processes, 
then the parameters of interest should only reflect the influence of those two 
processes, and should not be influenced by other cognitive processes. 
According to Riefer and Batchelder (1995), assessment of a model involves 
manipulating several independent variables, and determining whether the 
--���·��� 
' 
_ influence of these variables on th� ,model's parameters are theoretically 
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plausible. !he pr�ser,t,stu�y p_r9yide.s a ·good example of a validity study, in 
which a series of studies were conducted to measure the effects of several 
independent variables on storage and retrieval processes. Specifically, the 
validity of the models can be explored by examining the effects of mixed and · 
unmixed lists; list-length, presentation rate, level of association, and sentence 
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complexity, and determining their influence on storage (represented by storage 
parameter a in both models), and retrieval (represented by retrieval parameter ri  
in the Riefer-Rouder model, and parameter r in the Rouder-Batchelder model). 
Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis provides one test of the 
validity of the models. Riefer and , LaMay posited that it should be possible to 
obtain a storage advantage for common items and a retrieval advantage for 
bizarre items in the same experimental design. This was the purpose of 
Experiment 1, and a two-factor explanation for mixed-list designs Was 
accomplished. Thus, both the Riefer-Rouder (1992) and Rouder-Batchelder 
(1999) models determined that, in a mixed-list design, common items are stored 
better, and bizarre items are retrieved better. This result is quite plausible and 
consistent with Riefer and LaMay's two-factor theory. Such a result supports the 
validity of the multinomial models as measurement tools for storage and 
retrieval. 
Experiment 2, which examined list length and presentation rate, also 
provides support for the validity of the two models. The results of Experiment 2 
showed that short lists are stored better than long lists. This is a logical result,' 
because a short list of stimuli allows subjects to focus on and rehearse each 
individual item. This should increase storage capacity, and ultimately increase 
the storage parameter a. The results of Experiment 2 also showed that short lists 
are retrieved better than long lists. This, too, makes theoretical sense. Just as a 
short list of stimuli should be easier to store, the limited amount of information in 
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the memory set should also make that information easier to retrieve. Thus, it is 
psychologically plausible that a short list of items is both stored better and 
retrieved better. 
Further support for the validation of the models was found in the 
examination of presentation rate in Experiment 2. It was found that a slow 
presentation rate increases storage, but had no effect on retrieval. It is quite 
• logical that giving subjects extra study time allows the information to be stored 
better. In addition, the present results are the same as those found in a similar 
study conducted by Riefer and Batchelder (1987), who also examined 
presentation rate. By using a different multinomial model, they also found that 
items presented at a slow presentation rate increased storage, but had no effect 
on retrieval. Finding the same results with a different model adds further support 
to the validity of the present study. The converging evidence of the separate 
models are both in the same direction and show the same storage advantage for 
items presented at a slow presentation rate. 
Experiment 3 predicted a memory advantage for low associates in free 
recall and a memory 'advantage for high associates in cued recall (cf. Hirshman, 
1988). Once these predictions were met, the subsequent effects on storage and 
retrieval were then analyzed. The analysis of both models revealed that low 
associates were retrieved significantly better than high associates. This not only 
supports predictions for free recall, but it also provides support for Hirshman's 
(1988) retrieval-based explanation for low associates. High-associates, in turn, 
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showed a storage advantage, but this finding failed to reach statistical 
significance. Although not significant, the improved storage for high associates 
is consistent with results found by Batchelder and Riefer (1980). Using a 
different model for storage and retrieval, they observed that high-associate 
category pairs were stored (but not retrieved) better than low-associate category 
pairs. The present results match theirs, using a different model and paradigm. 
Not only do these results provide converging evidence for the role of storage 
and retrieval in high and low associates, but they also support the validity of 
those models as measurement tools for these processes. 
The examination of sentence complexity in Experiment 4 provides further 
validation for the Riefer-Rouder (1992) and Rouder-Batchelder (1999) models. 
Although a bizarreness effect failed to emerge in this experiment, the models did 
reveal that simple sentences are stored better than complex sentences. It is 
logical that simple items should be stored better than items that are more 
difficult. Although future research will be needed to explore the role of sentence 
complexity more thoroughly, the finding of superior storage for simple sentences 
is at least theoretically plausible. Again, this logical result tends to support the 
validity of the models as tools for measuring storage and retrieval. 
Fit of the Models  
Another way to assess the validity of a model is the goodness of fit that it 
provides to the data. Riefer and Rouder's (1992) model was not only applied to 
the data to identify the various fits, but it was also compared to Rouder and 
Batchelder's (1998) multinomial model to determine which model provided a 
"'- r� ' 
better fit. The preseht study used the G2 goodness of fit statistic (Riefer & 
- � - .. { , 
Batchelder, 1988), which is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable,
,I ' � , � .;' 
; 
... 
to determine.the fit that each model provided to the data. 
Experiment 1 examined the effects of mixed-lists and unmixed-lists on 
storage and retrieval parameters. As Table 2 suggests, the Riefer-Rouder 
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( 1992) multinomial model provided a good fit to the data in most experimental 
conditions. The only bad fit was found when common items were presented in a 
mixed-list. This same pattern was evident when the Rouder-Batchelder (1999) 
model was used. However, the Rouder-Batchelder model showed an additional 
bad fit for bizarre items presented in an unmixed-list. Experiment 2 examined 
list-length and presentation rate, and found fits similar to that of Experiment 1. 
As Table 5 indicates, the Riefer-Rouder model provided a good fit in six of the 
eight experimental conditions; the only bad fits were found when common items 
were presented in a short-lisUslow rate condition, and in a long-lisUfast rate 
condition. This was similar to the Rouder-Batchelder model, which found good 
fits in seven of the eight experimental conditions; the only bad fit was found 
when common items were presented in a long-lisUslow rate condition. 
The Riefer-Rouder and Rouder-Batchelder models deviated the most 
from each other in Experiment 3. Table 9 shows that the Riefer-Rouder model 
provided a good fit in three of the four conditions. The only bad fit was found 
when common items were presented in a low-associate condition. The Rouder-
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Batchelder model, however, provided a bad fit in all experimental conditions. 
This is an example of the differences in a model's ability to handle data. These 
opposing results can be contrasted sharply with Experiment 4, where both 
models provided a good overall fit. As can be seen in Table 12, the Riefer­
Rouder model provided good fits in all four experimental condftions, and the 
Rouder-Batchelder model provided good fits in three of the four experimental 
�ondition; The only bad fit was found when bizarre items were presented in 
simple sentences. 
Based on the goodness of fit measurements for the Riefer-Rouder (1992) 
and Rouder-Batchelder ( 1999) models, it is clear that neither model had a clear­
cut advantage over the other. In an earlier study, Riefer and LaMay ( 1998) 
applied both models to their data and, although both provided the same pattern 
of results, they found that the Rouder-Batchelder model provided a better fit to 
the data. Riefer and LaMay suggested that the Rouder-Batchelder model may 
provide a more parsimonious and valid methodology. However, the present 
�tudy failed to show any consistent pattern of fits between the two models. In · 
fact, it is reasonable to conclude that the Riefer-Rouder model may have 
actually had a slight edge in .the p��sent study. Although the pattern of results is 
variab\e throughout t.he four experitnents, · the Riefer-Rouder model provided bad 
fits in only,four of the twenty'experimental conditions across the four 
experiments, but the Rouder-Batchelder model provided bad fits in twice as 
many ( eight) experimental conditions. 
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Final Conclusions 
In summary, the purpose of the present study was to examine the strength 
of Riefer and LaMay's (1998) two-factor hypothesis, as well as the validity of 
Riefer and Rouder's (1992) and Rouder and Batchelder's (1999) multinomial 
models. To test the strength and validity of these models, a bizarreness effect 
was predicted for most conditions. The bizarreness effect, however, remains 
tenuous, and the predictions that the present study made about the bizarreness 
effect were not always found. Several variables known to cause a bizarreness 
effect were manipulated to test the strength of Riefer arid LaMay's two-factor 
hypothes_is, which was well supported throughout the experiments. These 
variables were also used to test the validity of the Riefer-Rouder and Rouder­
Batchelder models. 
The present study has provided strong evidence for th� strength of Riefer 
and LaMay's (1998) two-factor theory, as well as the validity of the Riefer­
Rouder (1992) and Rouder-Batchelder (1999) models. It is clear that the storage 
and retrieval models presented in this study are valid and useful tools for 
analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of the bizarreness effect. However, the 
bizarreness effect remains such a puzzling and elusive phenomenon that its 
success or failure is often unpredictable. This was quite evident in Experiment 4, 
where a bizarreness effect was not observed, even though it was found in the 
previous three experiments using nearly identical stimuli. But the fault lies in the 
unpredictability of the bizarreness effect, "and not in the validity of the models. 
f \"'" -� ,.. t{ 
' .
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Each model provided a psychologically logical and plausible explanation for 
most findings, and they received additional support by the converging evidence 
of other multinomial models (Batchelder & Riefer, 1980; Riefer & Batchelder, 
1987). 
Because both the Riefer-Rouder and Rouder-Batchelder models appear 
to be valid measures of storage and retrieval, it would be beneficial for future 
researchers to use these models to further explore the bizarreness effect. For 
example, a logical extension to the present research would be to determine how 
storage and retrieval processes can be used to explain such variables as list­
length and presentation rate; two variables that have yet to be systematically 
manipulated in a single experimental design. Overall, the present study has 
provided researchers with a valid and psychologically plausible theory of storage 
and retrieval. It is therefore clear that the storage and retrieval models presented 
in this study can be used in any psychological study that examines storage and 
retrieval processes in memory. 
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Appendix A 
Bizarre and Common Sentences Used in the Four Experiments 
Experiment 1: Mixed-Lists/Unmixed-Lists 
Subjects in the mixed list group were presented with 6 common and 6 bizarre 
sentences, subjects in the unmixed/common group received 12 common 




The GIRL kissed the DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID spilled the AMMONIA 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG chased the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH appeared on the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE fell on the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT rested on top of the TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was swimming in the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER crawled on the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE ate the HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP shined•on the BOOK.• 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF howled at the MOON. 
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SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were placed by the MILK. 
Bizarre:  
GIRL-DOLL 
The GIRL boiled the DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID drank the AMMONIA 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG rode the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH moved the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE climbed the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT screamed at the TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was eating out of the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER watered the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE smoked the HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP read the BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF lassoed the MOON. 
SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were filled with MILK. 
98 
99 
Experiment 2: List Length/Presentation Rate 
Subjects were presented with a short list (10 sentences) of common and bizarre 
sentences, or a long list (20 sentences) of common and bizarre sentences. 
Presentation rate was be either 6 s or 12 s. 
Common:  
GIRL-DOLL 
The GIRL kissed the DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID spilled the AMMONIA 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG chased the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH appeared on the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE fell on the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT rested on top of the TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was swimming in the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER crawled on the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE ate the HAY. 
BOY-CAT 
The boy fed the CAT. 
DOCTOR-JOURNAL 
The DOCTOR read the JOURNAL. 
BANKER-NEWSPAPER 
The BANKER folded the NE1A/I'AP'ER., - 
CAR-FENCE 
The CAR drove past the FENCE. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP shined on the BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF howled at the MOON. 
SUN-WEST 
The SUN set in the WEST. 
SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were placed by the MILK. 
NURSE-COMPUTER 
The NURSE worked at the COMPUTER. 
SOLDIER-CHAIR 
The SOLDIER was sitting in the CHAIR. 
PERFORMER-AUDIENCE 
The PERFORMER sand for the AUDIENCE. 
Bizarre:  
GIRL-DOLL 
The GIRL boiled the DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID drank the AMMONIA 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG rode the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH moved the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE climbed the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT screamed at the TELEVISION. 
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GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was eating out of the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER watered the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE smoked the HAY. 
BOY-CAT 
The boy juggled the CAT. 
DOCTOR-JOURNAL 
The DOCTOR burned the JOURNAL. 
BANKER-NEWSPAPER 
The BANKER floated on the NEWSPAPER. 
CAR-FENCE 
The CAR petted the FENCE. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP read the BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF lassoed the MOON. 
SUN-WEST 
The SUN did backflips in the WEST. 
SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were filled with MILK. 
NURSE-COMPUTER 
The NURSE danced on the COMPUTER. 
SOLDIER-CHAIR 
The SOLDIER was wearing the CHAIR. 
PERFORMER-AUDIENCE 




Experiment 3: .Level of Association 
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Each subject received 12 sentences consisting of three high-association 
(common), three high-association (bizarre), three low-association (common), and 
three low-association (bizarre). 
High-Association: 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
Common: The GOLDFISH was swimming in the BOWL. 
Bizarre: The GOLDFISH was eating out of the BOWL. 
SPIDER-WEB 
Common: The SPIDER crawled on the WEB. 
Bizarre: The SPIDER watered the WEB. 
LAMP-SHADE 
Common: The LAMP shined through the SHADE. 
Bizarre: The LAMP bit the SHADE. 
SUN-WEST 
Common: The SUN set in the WEST. 
Bizarre: The SUN did backflips in the WEST. 
MINISTER-BIBLE 
Common: The MINISTER read the BIBLE. 
Bizarre: The MINISTER cooked the BIBLE. 
GIRL-DOLL 
Common: The GIRL kissed the DOLL. 
Bizarre: The GIRL boiled the DOLL. 
Low-Association: 
WOLF-MOON 
Common: The WOLF howled at the MOON. 
Bizarre: The WOLF lassoed the MOON. 
DOG-BICYCLE 
Common: The DOG chased the BICYCLE. 
Bizarre: The DOG rode the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
Common: The COCKROACH appeared on the STOVE. 
Bizarre: The COCKROACH moved the STOVE. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
Common: The PLANT rested on top of the TELEVISION. 
Bizarre: The PLANT screamed at the TELEVISION. 
TRAIN-BLUEBERRIES 
Common: The TRAIN passed the BLUEBERRIES. 
Bizarre: The TRAIN picked' the BLUEBERRIES. 
SHOES-MILK 
Common: The SHOES were placed by the MILK. 
Bizarre: The SHOES were filled with MILK. 
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Experiment 4: Sentence Complexity 
Each subject received either 12 simple sentences (6 common and 6 bizarre) or 
12 complex sentences (6 common and 6 bizarre). 
Simple Common Sentences: 
GIRL-DOLL 
The GIRL kissed the DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID spilled the AMMONIA. 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG chased the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH appeared on the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE fell on the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT rested on top of the TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was swimming in the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER crawled on the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE ate the HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP shined on the BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF howled at the MOON. 
SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were placed by the MILK. 
, 
Simple Bizarre Sentences: 
GIRL-DOLL 
The GIRL boiled the DOLL. • 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The MAID drank the AMMONIA. 
DOG-BICYCLE 
The DOG rode the BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The COCKROACH moved the STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The SNOWFLAKE climbed the MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The PLANT screamed at the TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The GOLDFISH was eating out of the BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The SPIDER watered the SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The HORSE smoked the HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The LAMP read the BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The WOLF lassoed the MOON. 
SHOES-MILK 
The SHOES were filled with MILK. 
Complex Common Sentences: 
GIRL-DOLL 
The freckle-faced GIRL kissed the home-made DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONI,A. 
The lazy arrdg'ant MAID &pilled the pale green AMMONIA. 
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DOG-BICYCLE 
The curly-tailed DOG chased the red sting-ray BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The big brown COCKROACH appeared on the old pot-belly STOVE. 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The glistening SNOWFLAKE fell on the pine-filled MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The brass potted PLANT rested on top of the black-and-white console 
TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The fan-tailed GOLDFISH was swimming in the finely-etched glass BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The long-legged SPIDER crawled on the sun-baked SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The red-spotted HORSE ate the freshly bundled HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The clear glass LAMP shined on the old worn-out BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The scraggly WOLF howled at the bright full MOON. 
SHOES-MILK 
The old torn-up tennis SHOES were placed by the warm non-fat MILK. 
Complex Bizarre Sentences: 
GIRL-DOLL 
The freckle-faced GIRL boiled the home-made DOLL. 
MAID-AMMONIA 
The lazy aiTogant MAII5 drank the pale green AMMONIA. 
DOG-BICYCLE , 
The curly-tailed DOG rode the red sting-ray BICYCLE. 
COCKROACH-STOVE 
The big brown COCKROACH moved the old pot-belly STOVE. 
106 
SNOWFLAKE-MOUNTAIN 
The glistening SNOWFLAKE climbed the pine-filled MOUNTAIN. 
PLANT-TELEVISION 
The brass potted PLANT screaMed at the black-and-white TELEVISION. 
GOLDFISH-BOWL 
The fan-tailed GOLDFISH was eating out of the finely-etched glass BOWL. 
SPIDER-SIDEWALK 
The long-legged SPIDER watered the sun-baked SIDEWALK. 
HORSE-HAY 
The red-spotted HORSE smoked the freshly bundled HAY. 
LAMP-BOOK 
The clear glass LAMP read the old worn-out BOOK. 
WOLF-MOON 
The scraggly WOLF lassoed the bright full MOON. 
SHOES-MILK 
The old torn-up tennis SHOES were filled with warm non-fat MILK. 
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Appendix B 
Proportion Correct and Ni Recall Events for the Four Experiments 
Experiment 1 - Mixed-Lists/Unmixed Lists 
Unmixed-List, Common Items (n = 21)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 IN3 N4 N6 N6 
1 .67 .67 6 0 2 0 2 2 
2 .50 .92 5 0 6 0 1 0 
3 .33 .92 3 1 7 0 0 1 
4 .58 .92 6 1 4 0 0 1 
5 .75 1.00 9 0 3 0 0 0 
6 .67 1.00 7 1 4 0 0 0 
7 .33 .42 4 0 1 0 0 7 
8 .42 .67 5 0 3 0 0 4 
9 .58 .75 7 0 2 0 0 3 
10 .58 .92 7 0 4 0 0 1 
11 .67 1.00 7 1 4 0 0 0 
12 .33 .25 3 0 0 0 1 8 
13 .42 .42 2 1 2 0 2 5 
14 .75 1.00 9 0 3 0 0 0 
15 .67 .92 7 0 3 0 1 1 
16 .83 .92 10 0 1 0 0 1 
17 .58 .92 7 0 4 0 0 1 
18 75 1.00 9 0 3 0 0 0 
19 .25 .50 3 0 3 0 0 6 
20 .50 .67 4 0 4 0 2 2 
21 .33 .92 4 0 7 0 0 1 
108 
109 
Unmixed-List, Bizarre Items (n = 22)  
_Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 
22 .58 .92 7 0 4 0 0 1 
23 .75 .92 5 3 3 1 0 0 
24 .42 .75 3 0 6 2 0 1 
25 .58 .92 6 0 5 0 1 0 
26 .83 1.00 10 0 2 0 0 0 
27 .42 .42 3 0 2 0 2 5 
28 .33 .50 3 0 3 0 1 5 
29 .58 .92 7 0 4 0 0 1 
30 .67 .92 7 0 4 0 1 0 
31 .42 .75 2 0 7 2 1 0 
32 .58 1.00 5 2 5 0 0 0 
33 .75 .58 6 0 1 3 0 2 
34 .42 .58 5 0 2 0 1 4 
35 .25 .25 3 0 0 0 0 9 
36 .42 .00 0 0 0 3 3 6 
37 .25 .08 1 0 0 1 1 9 
38 .58 .75 5 2 2 0 0 3 
39 .50 .83 5 0 5 0 1 1 
40 .58 .75 4 2 3 0 2 1 
41 .75 1.00 7 2 3 0 0 0 
42 .58 .67 5 2 1 0 1 3 
43 .75 .00 0 0 0 1 7 4 
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Mixed-List, Common Items (n = 51)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 NN4 N5 N6 
44 .33 .50 
45 .33 .50 
46 .33 1.00 
47 .33 1.00 
48 .17 1.00 
49 .00 1.00 
50 .50 .83 
51 .33 .83 
52 .67 .67 
53 .50 1.00 
54 .67 .83 
55 .67 1.00 
56 .17 .50 
57 .17 .50 
58 .33 .83 
59 .67 .67 
60 .17 1.00 
61 .00 .83 
62 .50 .83 
63 .33 .33 
64 .33 .67 
65 .33 1.00 
66 .50 .83 
67 .67 1.00 
68 .17 .50 
69 .17 .67 
70 .33 1.00 
71 .17 .83 
72 .33 .83 
73 .50 .83 
74 .33 .83 
75 .50 .67 
76 .50 .67 
77 .33 .00 
78 .17 .17 
79 .67, .67 
2 0 0 2 0 2 
2 0 3 0 0 1 
2 0 4 0 0 0 
2 0 4 0 0 0 
2 0 4 0 0 0 
0 0 6 0 0 0 
2 1 2 0 0 1 
5 0 0 0 0 1 
4 0 0 0 0 2 
3 0 3 0 0 0 
2 0 3 0 1 0 
4 0 2 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 0 3 
0 0 3 0 1 2 
1 1 3 0 0 1 
4 0 0 0 0 2 
1 0 5 0 0 0 
0 0 5 0 0 1 
3 0 2 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0 4 
2 0 2 0 0 2 
2 0 4 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 1 
4 0 2 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 0 3 
1 0 3 0 0 2 
2 0 4 0 0 0 
1 0 4 0 0 1 
2 0 3 0 0 1 
2 0 3 1 0 0 
2 0 3 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0 2 
3 0 1 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 2 4 
1 0 0 0 0 5 
2 0 2 0 2 0 
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80 .33 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
81 .17 .33 0 0 2 1 0 3 
82 .33 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
83 .50 .83 2 1 2 0 0 1 
84 1.00 1.00 6 0 0 0 0 0 
85 .33 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
86 .67 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
87 .67 .83 3 0 2 0 1 0 
88 .17 .17 1 0 0 0 0 5 
89 .00 .33 0 0 2 0 0 4 
90 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
91 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
92 .50 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
93 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
94 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
Mixed-List, Bizarre Items (n = 51)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free Cued 	Ni N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 
44 .67 .50 3 0 0 0 1 2 
45 .83 .83 5 0 0 0 0 1 
46 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
47 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
48 1.00 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
49 .00 .67 0 0 4 0 0 2 
50 .17 .50 1 0 2 0 0 3 
51 .83 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
52 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
53 .50 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
54 1.00 .83 5 0 0 0 1 0 
55 1.00 1.00 5 1 0 0 0 0 
56 .50 .33 0 1 1 0 2 2 
57 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
58 .67 .67 2 0 2 0 2 0 
59 .50 .67 3 0 1 0 0 2 
60 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
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, 	61 .50 .67 3 0 1 0 0 2 
62 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
63 .17  .17 1 0 0 0 0 5 
64 .67 .67 3 0 1 0 1 1 
65 .33 1.00 2 0 4 0 0 0 
66 .50 .67 3 0 1 0 0 2 
67 .50 .50 3 0 0 0 0 3 
68 .50 .33 1 0 1 0 2 2 
69 .50 .67 2 0 2 0 1 1 
70 .50 .67 2 0 2 1 0 1 
71 1.00 1.00 6 0 0 0 0 0 
72 .67 .50 3 0 0 0 1 2 
73 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
74 .50 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
75 .17 .50 1 0 2 0 0 3 
76 .33 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
77 .50 .33 0 2 0 0 1 3 
78 .50 .50 2 1 0 0 0 3 
79 .67 .67 4 0 0 0 0 2 
80 .67 .83 3 0 2 0 1 0 
81 .33 .17 0 1 0 1 0 4 
82 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
83 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
84 .83 .83 5 0 0 0 0 1 
85 .50 .50 3 0 0 0 0 3 
86 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
87 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
88 .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 6 
89 .67 .33 2 0 0 0 2 2 
90 1.00 .83 5 0 0 0 1 0 
91 .67 .83 2 1 2 0 1 0 
92 .67 .83 3 1 1 0 0 1 
93 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
94 .33 .00 0 0 0 0 2 4 
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Experiment 2 - List-Length/Presentation Rate 
Short-List/Slow Rate Common Items (n = 38)  
15 1.00 .40 
16 	.60 	.40 
17 .60 .40 
18 	.60 	1.00 
19 .60 .80 
20 	.40 	1.00 
21 .60 1.00 
84 	.20 	1.00 
85 .60 1.00 
86 	.60 	1.00 
87 1.00 .80 
88 	.80 	.80 
89 .40 .80 
90 	.00 	: 'AO 
91 .40 1.00 
92 	 .60f 	, too 
93 .20 1.00 
94 	, .60 	' .11..160 
95 .20 .80 
0 1 1 0 2 1 
2 0 0 0 1 2 
3 0 2 0 0 0 
1 1 2 0 1 0 
2 0 3 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 0 
1 0 4 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 0 0 1 
0 0 2 0 0 3 
2 0 3 0 0 0 
.3 0 2 0 0 0 
- 	1 0 4 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 0 
1 0 3 0 0 1 
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 	 N4 N5 N6 
1 	 .20 	 .80 	1 	1 	2 	0 	0 	1 
2 .40 1.00 2 	0 	3 	0 	0 	0 
3 	 .20 	 .80 	1 	0 	3 	0 	0 	1 
4 .40 .80 0 	1 	3 	0 	1 	0 
5 	 .20 	1.00 	2 	0 	3 	0 	0 	0 
6 .60 .80 3 	0 	1 	0 	0 	1 
7 	 .60 	 .60 	2 	0 	1 	0 	1 	1 
8 .40 .60 1 	0 	2 	0 	1 	1 
9 	 .60 	 .40 	2 	0 	0 	0 	1 	2 
10 1.00 1.00 5 	0 	0 	0 	0 	0 
11 	 .60 	1.00 	3 	0 	2 	0 	0 	0 
12 .40 .60 2 	0 	1 	0 	0 	2 
13 	 .40 	1.00 	2 	0 	3 	0 	0 	0 
14 .40 1.00 2 	0 	3 	0 	0 	0 
2 0 3 0 0 0 
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96 1.00 .80 4 0 0 0 1 0 
97 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
98 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
99 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
100 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
Short-List/Slow Rate Bizarre Items (n = 38)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 N3 114 N5 N6 
1 .60 .60 1 1 1 0 1 1 
2 .80 1.00 3 1 1 0 0 0 
3 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
4 .20 .40 0 0 2 0 1 2 
5 .40 .60 1 0 2 0 0 2 
6 .40 .80 1 1 2 0 0 1 
7 1.00 .80 4 0 0 0 1, 0 
8 .40 .20 0 1 0 0 1 3 
9 .60 .40 2 0 0 0 1 2 
10 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
11 .20 .80 1 0 3 0 0 1 
12 .80 .60 3 0 0 0 1 1 
13 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
14 .60 1.00 2 1 2 0 0 0 
15 .60 .60 3 0 0 0 0 2 
16 .40 .20 1 0 0 0 1 3 
17 .40 .40 1 0 1 0 1 2 
18 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
19 .60 .40 2 0 0 0 1 2 
20 .40 .00 0 0 0 1 1 3 
21 .60 1.00 2 1 2 0 0 0 
84 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
85 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
86 1.00 .60 3 0 0 0 2 0 
87 .60 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
88 .40 .40 1 1 0 0 0 3 
89 1.00 1.00 5 0 0 0 0 0 
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90 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
91 .80 80 4 0 0 0 0 1 
92 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
93 .80 .60 3 0 0 1 0 1 
94 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
95 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
96 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
97 .80 .80 4 0 0 0 0 1 
98 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
99 1.00 1.00 5 0 0 0 0 0 
100 .60 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
Short-List/Fast Rate Common Items (n = 35)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 N N4 N5 N6 
22 1.00 1.00 5 0 0 0 0 0 
23 .40 .40 2 0 0 0 0 3 
24 .40 .40 2 0 0 0 0 3 
25 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
26 .20 .80 1 0 3 0 0 1 
27 ' .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 5 
28 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
29 .20 .20 1 0 0 0 0 4 
30 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
31 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
32 .40 .80 1 1 2 0 0 1 
33 .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 5 
34 .80 .80 3 0 1 0 1 0 
35 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
36 .20 .20 1 0 0 0 0 4 
37 .60 .40 2 0 1 1 0 1 
38 .40 .40 2 0 0 0 0 3 
39 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
40 .40 .60 1 0 2 0 1 1 
41 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
69 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
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70 .40 .60 1 0 2 0 1 1 
71 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
72 .80 .40 2 0 0 0 2 1 
73 .20 .80 1 0 3 0 0 1 
74 .60 .40 2 1 0 0 0 2 
75 .40 .60 2 0 1 0 0 2 
76 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
77 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
78 .60 .40 2 0 0 1 0 2 
79 .60 .00 0 0 0 0 3 2 
80 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
81 .40 .40 1 0 1 0 1 2 
82 .40 .80 1 0 3 0 0 1 
83 .40 .60 2 0 1 0 0 2 
Short-List/Fast Rate Bizarre Items (n = 35)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events  
Subject Free 	Cued Ni N2 N3 N IN5 N6 
22 1.00 1.00 5 0 0 0 0 0 
23 .40 .20 1 0 0 0 1 3 
24 .20 .40 1 0 1 0 0 3 
25 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
26 .60 .60 3 0 0 0 0 2 
27 .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 5 
28 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
29 .20 .40 1 0 1 0 0 3 
30 .80 1.00 3 1 1 0 0 0 
31 .60 .60 2 0 1 0 1 1 
32 .40 .40 2 0 0 0 0 3 
33 .60 .20 1 0 0 0 2 2 
34 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
35 .40 .40 1 0 1 0 1 2 
36 .40 .00 0 0 0 0 2 3 
37 60 .00 0 0 0 0 2 3 
38 .20 .20 1 0 0 0 0 4 
39 .60 1.00 3 0 2 0 0 0 
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40 .40 .40 2 0 0 0 0 3 
41 1.00 .80 4 0 0 0 1 0 
69 1.00 .80 3 1 0 0 1 0 
70 .80 .40 1 1 0 0 2 1 
71 .40 .40 1 0 1 0 1 2 
72 .60 80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
73 .80 1.00 4 0 1 0 0 0 
74 .80 .80 • 2 0 1 0 2 0 
75 .60 1.00 2 1 2 0 0 0 
76 .40 1.00 2 0 3 0 0 0 
77 .60 .80 3 0 1 0 0 1 
78 .60 .20 0 1 0 0 2 2 
79 .40 .20 1 0 0 0 1 3 
80 .80 .80 4 0 0 0 0 1 
81 .20 .40 1 0 1 0 0 3 
82 .40 .80 2 0 2 0 0 1 
83 .40 .20 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Long-List/Slow Rate Common Items (n = 27)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 
42 .30 .80 2 0 6 0 1 1 
43 .40 .70 4 0 3 0 0 3 
44 .20 .90 1 0 8 0 1 0 
45 .40 .90 4 0 5 0 0 1 
46 .20 .70 2 0 5 0 0 3 
47 .10 .10 1 0 0 0 0 9 
48 .40 .20 2 0 0 1 0 7 
49 .30 .50 2 1 2 0 0 5 
50 .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 10 
51 .30 .90 3 0 6 0 0 1 
52 .10 .50 1 0 4 0 0 5 
53 .50 1.00 5 0 5 0 0 0 
54 .50 .90 5 0 4 0 0 1 
55 .60 .60 3 0 3 0 3 1 
56 .30 .80 2 0 6 0 1 1 
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57 .50 .90 5 0 4 0 0 1 
58 .30 .50 2 1 2 0 0 5 
59 .30 1.00 3 0 7 0 0 0 
60 .50 1.00 5 0 5 0 0 0 
61 .50 .70 2 1 4 1 1 1 
62 .50 .80 4 1 3 0 0 2 
63 .10 .20 0 0 2 0 1 7 
64 .50 .80 4 1 3 0 0 2 
65 .50 .90 5 0 4 0 0 1 
66 .30 .80 3 0 5 0 0 2 
67 .60 .90 6 0 3 0 0 1 
68 .20 .80 1 1 5 0 0 3 
Long-List/Slow Rate Bizarre Items (n = 27)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events  
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 	N4 N6 N6 
42 .50 .70 5 0 2 0 0 3 
43 .50 .50 3 1 1 0 1 4 
44 .60 .60 5 0 1 0 1 3 
45 .50 .60 3 0 3 1 1 2 
46 .50 .50 4 0 1 0 1 4 
47 .30 .10 1 0 0 0 2 7 
48 .20 .00 0 0 0 0 3 7 
49 .40 .20 1 1 0 1 1 6 
50 ' .00 .00 0 0 0 0 0 10 
51 .30 .70 2 0 5 0 1 2 
52 .40 .60 4 0 2 0 0 4 
53 .50 .60 4 0 2 0 1 3 
54 .60 .60 5 0 1 0 1 3 
55 .50 .30 1 0 2 0 4 3 
56 .50 .90 5 0 4 0 0 1 
57 .60 .80 6 0 2 0 0 2 
58 .40, .50 3 1 1 0 0 5 
59 .30 .90 3 0 6 0 0 1 
60 .40 .90 4 0 5 0 0 1 
61 .30 .70 3 0 4 0 0 3 
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62 .40 .80 3 1 4 0 0.2 
63 .00 .10 0 0 1 00 9 
64 .20 .70 0 2 5 0 3 
65 .40 .90 3 1 5 0 0 1 
66 .20 .50 1 1 3 0 0 5 
67 .60 .90 5 1 3 0 0 1 
68 .60 .90 4 0 3 0 0 3 
Long-List/Fast Rate Common Items (n = 28)  
Proportion Correct • 	 Recall Events 
Subject 	Free 	Cued -1 N2 N3N N5 N6 
101 .20 .10 1 0 0 0 1 8 
102 .20 .70 2 0 5 0 0 3 
103 .30 .80 3 0 5 0 0 2 
104 .50 .00 0 1 0 0 4 5 
105 .30 .50 2 0 3 0 1 4 
106 .30 .40 2 0 2 0 3 3 
107 .30 .50 1 1 3 0 1 4 
108 .10 .30 1 0 2 0 0 7 
109 .40 .60 3 0 3 1 0 3 
110 .30 .90 3 0 6 0 0 1 
111 .40 .50 3 1 1 0 0 5 
112 .50 .70 4 0 3 0 1 2 
113 .40 .90 4 0 5 0 0 1 
114 .40 .70 3 1 3 0 0 3 
115 .40 .90 3 0 6 0 1 0 
116 .40 .50 4 0 1 0 0 5 
117 .70 .80 7 0 1 0 0 2 
118 .70 1.00 7 0 3 0 0 0 
119 .60 .90 5 0 3 1 0 1 
120 .20 .20 1 0 1 0 1 7 
121 .40 .50 2 0 3 0 2 3 
122 .50 .70 4 0 3 0 1 2 
123 .30 .70 3 0 4 0 0 3 
124 .20 .60 1 1 4 0 0 4 
125 .20 .40 1 1 2 0 0 6 
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126 .50 .70 4 0 3 0 1 2 
127 .50 .70 4 0 3 0 1 2 
128 .30 .60 3 0 3 0 0 4 
Long-List/Fast Rate Bizarre Items (n = 28)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 IN3 N4 N5 N6 
101 .40 .10 1 0 0 0 3 6 
102 .30 .60 3 0 3 0 0 4 
103 .60 1.00 4 2 4 0 0 0 
104 .50 .20 0 1 0 0 5 4 
105 .50 .40 3 0 1 0 2 4 
106 .10 .30 1 0 2 0 0 7 
107 .50 .60 2 3 1 0 0 4 
108 .20 .10 1 0 0 0 1 8 
109 .20 .20 1 0 1 0 1 7 
110 .70 .90 7 0 2 0 0 1 
111 .40 .20 1 0 1 0 3 5 
112 .50 .60 4 0 2 0 1 3 
113 .50 .80 5 0 3 0 0 2 
114 .60 .60 3 1 2 0 2 2 
115 .50 .40 4 0 0 0 1 5 
116 .20 .30 1 0 2 0 1 6 
117 .70 .80 5 0 3 0 2 0 
118 .30 .60 2 1 3 0 0 4 
119 .40 .50 1 1 4 0 2 2 
120 .40 .30 2 1 0 0 1 6 
121 .20 .60 2 0 4 0 0 4 
122 .60 .40 1 1 2 0 4 2 
123 .50 .80 5 0 3 0 0 2 
124 .40 .50 4 0 1 0 0 5 
125 .20 .20 0 1 1 0 1 7 
126 .40 .70 3 0 4 0 1 2 
127 .40 .70 3 0 4 1 0 2 
128 .60 .90 6 0 3 0 0 1 
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Experiment 3 - Level of Association 
High Associate/Common Items (N = 69) 
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject 	Free 	Cued -1 N2 N3  N4 N5 N6 
1 .67 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
2 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
3 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
4 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
5 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
6 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
7 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
8 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
9 .33 -0- 0 0 0 1 0 2 
10 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
11 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
12 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
13 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
14 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
15 .33 -0- 0 0 0 1 0 2 
16 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
17 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
18 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
19 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
20 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
21 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
22 .33 .33 1 0 0 0 0 2 
23 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
24 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
25 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
26 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
27 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
28 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
29 -0- .33 0 0 1 0 0 2 
30 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
31 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
32 .67 -0- 0 0 0 2 0 1 
33 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
34 -0- .33 0 0 2 0 0 1 
35 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
36 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
37 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
38 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
39 .33 -0- 0 0 0 0 1 2 
40 1.00 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
41 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
42 .67 .67 2 0 0 0. 0 1 
43 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
44 .67 1.00 , 2 0 1 0 0 0 
45 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
46 -0- .67 • 0 0 2 0 0 1 
47 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
48 .67 .67 1 0 1 0 1 0 
49 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
50 -0- .67 0 0 2 0 0 1 
51 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
52 1.00 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
53 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
54 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
55 1.00 .67 1 1 0 1 0 0 
56 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
57 -0- .67 0 0 2 0 0 1 
58 -0- •1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
59 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
60 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
61 -0- .67 0 0 2 0 0 1 
62 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
63 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
64 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
65 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
66 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
67 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
68 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
69 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
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High Associate/Bizarre Items (N = 69) 
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 1\13 N N5 N6 
1 1.00 1.00 
2 1.00 1.00 
3 .67 1.00 
4 .67 1.00 
5 1.00 1.00 
6 1.00 1.00 
7 -0- 1.00 
8 1.00 1.00 
9 .67 -0- 
10 -0- .67 
11 .67 .67 
12 .67 1.00 
13 .33 .67 
14 .67 1.00 
15 -0- -0- 
16 .33 .33 
17 .33 1.00 
18 .33 1.00 
19 -0- 1.00 
20 -0- .67 
21 1.00 1.00 
22 .67 1.00 
23 .33 1.00 
24 .33 .67 
25 .33 1.00 
26 .33 .67 
27 1.00 1.00 
28 .33 1.00 
29 .33 .33 
30 .33 .67 
31 .33 .33 
32 .33 -0- 
33 1.00 .33 
34 .67 1.00 
35 .67 1.00 
36 .67 1.00 
2 	0 	1 
3 0 0 
2 	0 	1 
1 	0 	2 
3 	0 	0 
3 	0 	0 
0 	0 	3 
3 	0 	0 
0 	0 	0 
0 0 2 
1 	0 	1 
1 	1 	1 
0 0 2 
1 	1 	1 
0 	0 	0 
1 	0 	0 
1 	0 	2 
1 	0 	2 
0 	0 	3 
0 	0 	2 
3 	0 	0 
2 	0 	1 
1 	0 	2 
0 	0 	2 
1 	0 	2 
0 	0 	2 
3 	0 	0 
1 	0 	2 
1 	0 	0 
1 	0 	1 
0 	0 	1 
0 	0 	0 
1 	0 	0 
2 	0 	1 
2 	0 	1 
2 	1 	0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 3 
0 0 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 2 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 0 2 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
37 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
38 .33 1.00 	. 1 0 2 0 0 0 
39 .33 .33 1 0 0 0 0 2 
40 1.00 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
41 1.00 1.00 2 1 0 0 0 0 
42 .67 .33 1 0 0 0 1 1 
43 .67 1.00 2 0 1 O. 0 0 
44 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
45 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
46 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
47 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
48 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
49 .67 1.00 2 1 0 0 0 0 
50 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
51 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
52 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
53 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
54 .67.  .33 0 0 1 0 1 1 
55 .33 .67 1 0 0 0 0 2 
56 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
57 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
58 .67 .33 1 0 0 0 1 1 
59 1.00 1.00 2 1 0 0 0 0 
60 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
61 -0- .33 0 0 1 0 0 2 
62 .33 67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
63 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 
64 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
65 -0- .67 0 0 2 0 0 1 
66 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
67 .33 1.00 0 1 2 0 0 0 
68 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
69 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
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Low Associate/Common Items (N = 69)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events  
Subject Free Cued Ni N2 N N N IN6 
1 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
2 .33 .67 2 0 0 0 , 	0 1 
3 .33 .67 0 0 2 0 1 0 
4 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
5 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
'6 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
7 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
8 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
9 .33 -0- 0 0 0 1 0 2 
10 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
11 -0- .33 0 0 1 0 0 2 
12 1.00 1.00 1 2 0 0 0 0 
13 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
14 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
15 .67 -0- 0 0 0 2 0 1 
16 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
17 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
18 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
19 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
20 •.67 .67 1 0 0 0 1 1 
21 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
22 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
23 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
24 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
25 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
26 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
27 1.00 ' 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
28 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
29 .33 .33 0 0 1 0 1 1 
30 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
31 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
32 .67 -0- 0.0 0 2 0 1 
33 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
34 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
• 35 • .33 .67 1 1 0 0 0 1 
36 .33 	• 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
37 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
38 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
39 1.00 .67 2 0 0 0 1 0 
40 1.00 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
41 1.00 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
42 -0- .33 0 0 1 0 0 2 
43 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
44 .67 1.00 1 1 1 0 0 0 
45 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
46 1.00 1.00 2 1 0 0 0 0 
47 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
48 .33 .33 0 0 1 0 1 1 
49 .67 .67 1 0 1 0 1 0 
50 .33 .67 0 0 2 0 1 0 
51 .67 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
52 1.00 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
53 -0- 1.00 0 0 3 0 0 0 
54 .67 .67 1 0 0 0 0 2 
55 .67 .67 1 0 1 0 1 0 
56 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
57 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
58 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
59 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
60 .67 .67 1 0 1 1 0 0 
61 -0- .67 0 0 2 0 0 1 
62 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
63 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
64 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
65 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
66 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
67 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
68 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
69 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
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Low Associate/Bizarre Items (N = 69)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N 
	
N4 N5 N6 
1 .33 1.00 
2 1.00 1.00 
3 .67 1.00 
4 .67 67 
5 1.00 1.00 
6 1.00 1.00. 
7 .33 1.-00 
8 .67 1.00 
9 .67 -0- 
10 .67 .67 
11 1.00 1.00 
12 .67 1.00 
13 1.00 1.00 
14 .67 1.00 
15 -0- -0- 
16 .33 .67 
17 .33 1.00 
18 1.00 .67 
19 .33 .67 
20 .67 .33 
21 1.00 1.00 
22 .67 .33 
23 .67 1.00 
24 1.00 .67 
25 .67 .67 
26 1.00 1.00 
27 .33 .67 
28 .33 .67 
29 .33 .33 
30 1.00 1.00 
31 .67 .33 
32 .67 -0- 
33 .67 1.00 
34 .33 .33 
35 .67 1.00 
36 .67 .67 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
• 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 ,0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 1 
3' 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 2 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 2 
2 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
37 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
38 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
39 .33 .33 1 0 0 0 0 2 
40 1.00 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
41 1.00 1.00 2 0 0 0 0 1 
42 -0- .33 0 0 1 0 0 2 
43 .33 .33 1 0 0 0 0 2 
44 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
45 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
46 .67 .67 2 0 0 0 0 1 
47 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
48 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
49 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
50 .33 .67 1 0 1 0 0 1 
51 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
52 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
53 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
54 .67 .33 1 0 0 0 0 2 
55 1.00 .67 1 1 0 1 0 0 
56 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
57 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
58 .67 .33 1 0 0 0 1 1 
59 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
60 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
61 .67 .33 1 0 0 0 1 1 
62 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
63 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
64 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
65 .67 .67 0 1 1 0 1 0 
66 .33 1.00 1 0 2 0 0 0 
67 .67 1.00 2 0 1 0 0 0 
68 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
69 1.00 1.00 3 0 0 0 0 0 
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Experiment 4 - Sentence Complexity 
Simple Sentences/Common Items (n = 381 
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued Ni N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 
1 .83 1.00 4 1 1 0 0 0 
2 .33 1.00 2 0 4 0 0 0 
3 .50 .50 2 1 0 0 0 3 
4 .33 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
5 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
6 .50 .33 2 0 0 0 1 3 
7 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
8 .50 .83 2 0 3 0 1 0 
9 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
10 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
11 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
12 .17 .17 0 0 1 0 1 4 
13 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
14 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
15 .50 83 3 0 2 0 1 0 
16 .83 1.00 3 1 2 0 0 0 
26 .50 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
27 .50 .67 3 0 1 0 0 2 
28 .33 -0- 0 0 0 1 1 4 
29 .33 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
30 .33 1.00 2 0 4 0 0 0 
31 .50 .50 1 2 0 0 0 3 
32 .33 .17 1 0 0 0 1 4 
33 .83 .83 5 0 0 0 0 1 
34 .33 .83 1 0 4 0 1 0 
35 .50 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
36 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
49 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
50 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
51 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
52 .33 .67 1 0 3 0 1 1 
53 .33 .33 2 0 0 0 0 4 
54 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
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55 .17 .83 1.0 4 0 0 1 
56 .33 .33 1 0 1 1 0 3 
57 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
58 .17 .67 1 0 3 0 0 2 
59 .50 1.00 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Simple Sentences/Bizarre Items (n = 38)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 N3 N4 Ns N6 
1 .67 .83 4 0 1 0 0 1 
2 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
3 .83 .33 2 0 0 0 3 1 
4 .33 .50 1 0 2 0 1 2 
5 .67 .83 3 1 1 0 0 1 
6 .83 .83 5 0 0 0 0 1 
7 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
8 .67 1.00 3 1 2 0 0 0 
9 .50 .67 2 0 2 0 1 1 
10 .33 .83 1 1 3 0 0 1 
11 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
12 .17 .17 1 0 0 0 0 5 
13 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
14 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
15 .50 .33 1 0 2 0 1 2 
16 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
26 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
27 .50 .33 1 0 1 1 1 2 
28 .67 -0- 0 0 0 4 0 2 
29 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
30 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
31 .50 .67 2 1 1 0 0 2 
32 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
33 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
34 .50 .83 2 0 3 0 1 0 
35 .50 .67 4 0 0 0 0 2 
36 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
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49 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
50 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
51 .50 .83 3 0 2 0 0 1 
52 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
53 .33 .50 0 2 3 0 0 1 
54 .50 1.00 3 0 3 0 0 0 
55 .50 1.00 1 2 3 0 0 0 
56 .17 .17 1 0 0 0 0 5 
57 .33 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
58 .33 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
59 .50 1.00 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Complex Sentences/Common Items (n = 41)  
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 1\j3 N4 N5 N6 
17 .83 .50 1 1 1 0 0 3 
18 .50 .67 2 0 2 0 1 1 
19 .17 .33 0 0 2 0 1 3 
20 .50 .83 2 0 3 0 1 0 
21 -0- .17 0 0 0 0 0 6 
22 .17 -0- 0 0 0 0 1 5 
23 .33 .67 2 0 1 0 0 3 
24 .33 .17 0 0 1 0 2 3 
25 .83 .33 1 1 0 0 3 1 
37 .83 .33 • 2 0 0 1 2 1 
38 .50 .67 3 0 1 0 0 2' 
39 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
40 .50 .50 1 0 2 0 2 1 
41 .83 1.00 5 0 1 0 0 0 
42 .17 .67 0 0 4 0 1 1 
43 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
44 .33 -0- 0 0 0 0 2 4 
45 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
46 .33 .50 1 0 2 0 1 2 
47 .17 .33 1 0 1 0 0 4 
48 .33 .33 2 0 0 0 0 4 
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60 ' .33 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
61 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
62 .33 .50 1 0 2 0 1 2 
63 .17 .17 0 0 1 0 1 4 
64 .17 .33 0 0 2 0 1 3 
65 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
66 .33 .50 1 0 2 0 1 2 
67 .17 .17 1 0 0 0 0 5 
68 .67 1.00 4 0 2 0 0 0 
69 .17 .67 1 0 3 0 0 2 
70 -0- .50 0 0 3 0 0 3 
71 .17 .67 1 0 3 0 0 2 
72 .17 -0- 0 0 0 0 1 5 
73 .50 .50 1 1 1 0 1 2 
74 -0- -0- 0 0 0 0 0 6 
75 .17 .50 - 1 0 2 0 0 3 
76 .50 .67 1 2 1 0 0 2 
77 -0- .17 0 0 1 0 0 5 
78 .17 -0- 0 0 0 0 0 6 
79 .50 1.00 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Complex Sentences/Bizarre Items (n = 41) 
Proportion Correct 	 Recall Events 
Subject Free 	Cued N1 N2 	N4 N5 N6 
17 .83 .67 2 0 2 0 0 2 
18 .67 .67 3 0 1 1 0 1 
19 .67 .67 2 2 0 0 0 2 
20 .50 .83 2 1 2 0 0 1 
21 -0- -0- 0 0 0 0 0 6 
22 .17 .33 0 0 2 0 1 3 
23 .50 .17 2 0 0 0 1 3 
24 .33 .33 1 0 1 0 1 3 
25 .50 .33 2 0 0 0 1 3 
37 .17 .17 0 0 1 0 1 4 
38 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
39 .50 .67 2 1 1 0 0 2 
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40 -0- .17 0 0 1 0 0 5 
41 .33 .67 1 0 3 0 1 1 
42 .67 .50 2 1 0 0 1 2 
43. .67 .67 3 1 0 0 0 2 
44 .33 .17 1 0 0 0 1 4 
45 .50 .83 2 0 3 0 0 1 
46 .67 .50 2 0 1 0 2 1 
47 .17 .33 0 1 1 0 0 4 
48 .33 .50 2 0 1 0 0 3 
60 .50 .83 2 0 3 0 1 0 
61 .67 .67 3 0 1 0 1 1 
62 .50 .33 1 1 0 0 1 3 
63 .17 -0- 0 0 0 0 1 5 
64 -0- .33 0 0 2 0 0 4 
65 .50 .33 2 0 0 0 1 3 
66 .17 .17 0 0 1 0 1 4 
67 -0- . 17 0 o 1 0 0 5 
68 .67 .33 2 0 0 0 2 2 
69 .67 .50 2 0 1 0 2 1 
70 .50 .50 2 0 1 0 1 2 
71 .50 .67 2 0 2 1 0 1 
72 .33 -0- 0 0 0 0 2 4 
73 .50 .17 0 1 0 0 2 3 
74 -0- -0- 0 0 0 0 0 6 
75 .33 .17 1 0 0 0 1 4 
76 .17 .33 1 0 1 0 0 4 
77 -0- .17 0 0 1 0 0 5 
78 .17 -0- 0 0 ·o 0 0 6 
79 .23 .67 1 1 2 0 0 2 
' ,' J' 
